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CHAPTER 3 
Trusts and Estates 
ROBERT G. STEWART" AND KATHERINE L. BABSON, JR."" 
§3.1. Revocable Trusts-Death of Settlor-Right of Creditors to 
Reach Assets after Death. It has been the traditional rule in Massachu-
setts that a creditor, during his debtor's lifetime, could reach assets 
which had been placed in trust by the debtor for the debtor's own 
benefit, even if the terms of the trust purport to prevent voluntary or 
involuntaryassignability.l Where the use of assets for the settlor's bene-
fit is in the pure discretion of the trustee, creditors have been allowed 
to reach trust assets to the maximum extent the trustee could have made 
discretionary distributions.2 Where a settlor has reserved only a limited 
interest in the trust, such as a life income interest, creditors have been 
able to reach the trust assets to the extent of the settlor's interest.3 
Where the settlor has retained a life interest for his own exclusive 
benefit, and has also reserved to himself a general power of appointment 
over the assets, Massachusetts law has also allowed creditors to reach 
assets to their full extent during the settlor's lifetime on the theory that 
the settlor has effectively retained full benefit over those assets.4 The 
Restatement of Property extends this right to the settlor's estate.5 Au-
thority has been ambiguous and scarce, however, as to whether the right 
of creditors to reach assets of a revocable trust survives the settlor's 
death where the power reserved was one to amend or revoke.6 Such 
"ROBERT G. STEWART is a partner in the law firm of Htjtchins & Wheeler, 
Boston. 
""KATHERINE L. BABSON, JR., is an associate in the law firm of Hutchins & 
Wheeler, Boston. 
§3.1. 1 E.g., Merchants Nat'l Bank of New Bedford v. MorrissEiY, 329 Mass. 601, 
109 N.E.2d 821 (1953); SCOTT, LAW OF TRUSTS § 156 (3d ed. t967) [hereinafter 
cited as SCOTT]. 
2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 156(2) (1959). 
3 SCOTT, § 156, at 1191. 
4 See Forbes v. Snow, 245 Mass. 85,140 N.E. 418 (1923). 
5 RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 328 (1940). 
6 The only cases found apparently on point are Schofield v. Cleveland Tmst Co., 
135 Ohio St. 328, 21 N.E.2d 119 (1939), cited by the court (1979 Mass. App. Ct. 
Adv. Sh. at 1036, 389 N.E.2d at 770) but contrary to its holdingj and In re Gran-
well, 20 N.Y.2d 91, 228 N.E.2d 779 (1967), which is in accord but on a different 
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powers of appointment are not sufficient where the beneficiary of the 
trust is a third person. Thus, when a settlor has placed property into 
a trust for the benefit of a third person and has reserved a power to 
revoke (or a general power of appointment), that power has not been 
viewed sufficient to subject those assets to claims of creditors.7 Like-
wise where a third person has placed property in trust for the benefit 
of a decedent and the decedent had the right to, but did not exercise, 
a general power of appointment over the assets, those assets are not 
subject to the claims of creditors of the decedent or his estate.s 
In a case, then, likely to have precedential value, the Appeals Court 
held during the Survey year in State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Reiser!) 
that where a settlor of an inter vivos trust has retained the power to 
amend and revoke or the power to direct disposition of principal and 
income, creditors of the settlor, folloWing his death, may reach in satis-
faction of the settlor's debts to them, to the extent not satisfied by the 
settlor's estate, those assets owned by the trust over which the settlor 
had such control at the time of his death as would have enabled the 
settlor to use trust assets for his own benefit.10 In Reiser, the settlor had 
created an inter vivos trust, reserving the power to amend or revoke 
and the right during his lifetime to direct the disposition of principal 
and incomeY He transferred to the trust the stock of five closely-held 
corporations.12 Approximately thirteen months later, the settlor applied 
to a bank for a $75,000 unsecured loan, which the bank granted after 
an examination of his personal financial statement.13 The statement 
contained, as its most Significant assets, real estate owned by the corpo-
rations.H The settlor advised the bank officers that he owned the con-
theory, that of fraudulent conveyance. United States v. Ritter, 558 F.2d 1165 (4th 
Cir. 1977), cited by the court at 1039, 389 N.E.2d at 771, did not directly deal 
with the power of revocation. Rather the court seemed instead to view an ap-
parent power to distribute the trust remainder by will as a general power of appoint-
ment and analyze only the general power authority. The RESTATEMENT OF PROP-
ERTY, § 328 (1940), states that where a settlor has retained a life benefit and a 
general power of appointment with no other beneficial interests he cannot destroy 
by exercising the power, his creditors can reach trust assets after his death where 
probate assets are insufficient to satisfy their claims. See also cases and texts cited 
in United States v. Ritter, 558 F.2d at 1168. 
7; National Shawmut Bank of Boston v. Joy, 315 Mass. 457, 53 N.E.2d 113 
( 1941); SCOTT, § 370.12; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 330, Comment 0 
(1959). 
S Shattuck v. Burrage, 229 Mass. 448, 118 N.E. 889 (1918); Crawford v. Lang-
maid, 171 Mass. 309, 50 N.E. 606 (1898). 
9 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 1032, 389 N.E.2d 768, further appellate review 
denied, 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1611. 
10 ld. at 1039-40, 380 N.E.2d at 771-72. 
11 ld. at 1033, 380 N.E.2d at 769. 
121d. 
131d. 
14 ld. 
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trolling interest in the corporations.15 The settlor died approximately 
four months later and his probate estate had insufficient assets to repay 
the bank loan.16 The bank brought an action against the trustee for 
satisfaction of its claim from trust assets. 
The court held in favor of the bank after initially rejecting two of its 
arguments. First, the comt rejected the bank's claim that the facts 
created a possible case for fraud. The court noted that the trial court 
had found no intention on the part of the settlor to misrepresent his 
financial position by failing to call attention to the fact that the stock 
was actually owned by the trust and not the settlor.17 Second, the 
court rejected the argument that a discretionary power in the trustees 
to pay debts and expenses of administration of a settlor's estate, 
combined with precatory language in the will expressing the decedent's 
wish that all of his just debts be fully paid, demonstrated an intention 
on the part of the settlor that the trustees in fact be required to pay 
such debts, reading into the trust the decedent's wishes as outlined in 
this will.18 The court concluded that there was no l(Ilanifestation of 
such an intent in the trust agreement, that the language of the trust 
demonstrated that .the settlor knew the difference between discretionary 
and mandatory powers, and that the trustees, having been given absolute 
discretion, could even refuse unreasonably to pay such debts provided 
that there was no abuse of discretion. 1 !1 There was no such abuse here, 
the court stated, since the trustees would have been justified in refusing 
to pay the debts for the sole reason of preserving the trust corpus for 
the benefit of the beneficiaries.2o 
The court decided the case directly on the issue of whether, as a 
matter of law, the assets which had been placed in such a trust by the 
settlor could be reached by his creditors upon his death. The court 
acknowledged that courts of the commonwealth have always given full 
effect to inter vivos trusts as separate entities from the probate estate.21 
It rejected, nonetheless, the argument that such sepan~tion of entities 
prohibited creditors of the settlor from reaching trust assets on the 
151d. 
161d. 
17 ld. at 1033-34, 389 N.E.2d at 769. 
18 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 1034, 1035, 389 N.E.2d at ,770. For another 
case dealing with the problem of reading a trust and will togeth¢r to ascertain the 
intent of the decedent, see First Nat'l Bank of Mount Dora v. Shawmut Bank of 
Boston, N.A., 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1329, 389 N.E.2d 1002, disCljssed at § 3 infra. 
19 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 1035, 1036, 389 N.E.2d a~ 770. 
20 ld. at 1035-36, 389 N.E.2d at 770. 
21 ld. at 1037, 389 N.E.2d at 770, citing National Shawmut iBank v. Joy, 315 
Mass. 457, 53 N.E.2d 113 (1941); Kerwin y. Donaghy, 317 Mass. 559, 59 N.E.2d 
299 (1945); and Ascher v. Cohen, 333 Mass. 397, 131 N.E.2d 1~8 (1956). 
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settlor's death.22 In so doing, the court cited as authority cases which 
hold that creditors can reach trust assets over which an individual, who 
possessed a general power of appointment, has in fact exercised that 
power by testamentary or by inter vivos disposition.23 The theory of 
those cases is that when an individual chooses to exercise dominion and 
control over property subject to the power, equity demands that he or 
his estate satisfy his just debts with the proceeds before benefitting 
others.24 The court stated: "It taxes the imagination to invent reasons 
why the same analysis and policy should not apply to trust property 
over which the settlor retains dominion at least as great as a power of 
appOintment." 25 Given the modem frequency of use of inter vivos 
trusts as basic estate planning instruments and the belief of many settlors, 
including apparently the settlor here, that property that they have placed 
in revocable trusts is their own property, the court said it would be 
"excessive obeisance" to form to prevent creditors from reaching the 
property at the death of the settlor merely because the property was 
technically held in revocable trust form rather than outright.26 
Because the court chose to reason from cases involving the exercise 
of powers of appointment and to apply their reasoning to a case involv-
ing the retention of the power of revocation, the Reiser decision may cast 
doubt upon the continued vitality of cases which hold that the mere 
retention without exercise of such powers does not subject the property 
to claims of creditors.27 On the other hand, if only the underlying policy 
of the cited authorities is considered, with the logical analogy limited 
to equating the power of revocation to the general power of appoint-
ment, the decision can be seen as simply adopting a rule closely analogous 
to that of the Restatement of Property. This rule states that reservation 
of a life interest and a general power of appointment subjects trust 
assets to the reach of creditors after death.28 Extension of the analogy 
to cases involving the exercise of a general power of appointment with-
out regard to the identity of the donor would open up a new avenue of 
22 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 1037, 389 N.E.2d at 771. 
23 E.g., State Street Trust v. Kissel, 302 Mass. 328, 19 N.E.2d 25 (1939); Shat-
tuck v. Burrage, 229 Mass. 448, 118 N.E. 889 (1918). See also Hill v. Treasurer 
and Receiver Gen., 227 Mass. 474, 116 N.E. 946 (1917). 
24 302 Mass. at 333, 19 N.E.2d at 28. 
25 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 1038, 389 N.E.2d at 771. The court also 
compared the power of revocation directly with the general power of appointment 
dealt with in RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 328, discussed at note 6 supra. 
26 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 1039, 389 N.E.2d at 771. 
27 E.g., Shattuck v. Burrage, 229 Mass. 448, 118 N.E. 889 (1918); Crawford v. 
Langmaid, 171 Mass. 309, 50 N.E. 606 (1898). But see RESTATEMENT OF PRop-
ERTY § 328 (1940). 
28 RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 328 (1940). 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 
1038, 389 N.E.2d at 771. 
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attack on transfers in trust for the benefit of third persons. While the 
court's analogy can be defended logically on the theory that prior actual 
ownership of assets and their transfer to the revocable trust are, in effect, 
the equivalent of exercising a general power of appointment by deed, 
such an analogy pulls the third person donor cases away from their 
separate, equitable status into the more general rule gove:Jtning possession 
of powers. The court might have avoided casting unintended suspicion 
on the other venerable doctrine by avoiding the exercise of power of 
appointment analogy altogether and simply declaring oil public policy 
grounds that a decedent cannot, by use of a vehicle such as a revocable 
trust for his own benefit, remove his assets from the reach of creditors 
even upon the accident of his death, analogizing only to the Restatement 
rule, which is itself based on public policy.29 
Reiser raises a number of areas of fertile inquiry. The first and most 
obvious question is the availability to creditors of assets which pour 
into a revocable trust upon the death of the settlor ~hich were not 
owned outright by the settlor during his lifetime. The Reiser court's 
opinion stated: 
i 
Assets which pour over into such a trust as a consequence of the 
settlor's death or after the settlor's death, over whicP the settlor 
did not have control during his life, are not subject to the reach of 
creditors since, as to those assets, the equitable princ.::iples· do not 
apply which place assets subject to creditors' disposatso 
Unfortunately, not all non-probate assets passing to a t~st fit this de-
scription. Assets over which the settlor may have had 4 special power 
of appointment and exercised the same in favor of the beneficiaries of 
his revocable trust or assets owned by a surviving spouse which upon 
the spouse's death find their way into the revocable tru~t are the most 
clearly immune from the reach of the settlor's creditors 'under this lan-
guage. Life insurance proceeds in Massachusetts are immune from the 
reach of creditors by statute.31 The status of employee, death benefits 
29 See, e.g., SCOTT, § 156. In re Cranwell, 20 N.Y.2d 91,228 N.E.2d 779 (1967), 
used the novel theory of fraudulent conveyance, reasoning that since the decedent 
maintained control over his assets until the moment of death, t1:\.e loss of control 
at his death was fraudulent as to creditors, regardless of intent. I 
30 1979 Mass. Apl;>. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 1040, 389 N.E.2d at 771, 772. 
31 C.L. c. 175, §§ 125, 126, 132C, and 135. The quoted language in Reiser, 
however, may not fully immunize such proceeds in jurisdictions without such statutes. 
Life insurance policies on the decedent's life are includible in hi~ gross estate for 
estate tax purposes so long as he retains "incidents of ownership" qver such policies. 
I.R.C. § 2042(2). It might be argued that an incident of ownership is sufficient 
"control" over the policy to subject the proceeds payable to a revocable trust to 
the reach of creditors. On the other hand, the decedent does npt, in the court's 
words, "have control during his life" over the actual proceeds oE the policies but 
5
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is somewhat unclear. Employee death benefits may consist in large part 
of vested employee or employer contributions or other vested rights over 
which the employee might have some control prior to his death. Reiser 
could be read as allowing creditors to reach employee death benefits 
up to vested amounts. 32 
A second series of questions raised by Reiser concerns the administra-
tion of the trust following the death of the settlor. One of the historic 
arguments for the use of an inter vivos revocable trust is the ability of 
the trustees to make dispositions for the benefit of beneficiaries after 
the death of the settlor without waiting for the probate process. While 
a prudent trustee will generally maintain sufficient trust assets following 
the death of the settlor to assure that proper provisions have been made 
for death taxes, it would now appear that a trustee must be cautious as 
to the availability of probate assets for payment of debts. The trustee, 
according to Professor Casner, should not be liable for creditors' claims 
if distributions are made pursuant to the instructions of the trust before 
creditors have taken appropriate steps to reach the assets.33 At the same 
time, the trustee may well have constructive or actual notice of claims 
and of the unavailability of probate assets to satisfy them, and such 
notice may give a trustee or a court some pause. 
A related matter is the ability of creditors to reach such assets after 
the expiration of the statutory period for filing claims against the 
estate. 34 Those statutes on their face protect only executors and ad-
ministrators, not trustees of revocable trustS.35 It certainly ought to be 
the rule that a creditor has no greater rights to reach the assets of the 
revocable trust than he has with respect to the probate estate itself. A 
creditor should be required to file a claim against the estate in a timely 
fashion before he is allowed access to the assets in the revocable trust. 
Although this argument may be implicit in the court's language limiting 
its rule to situations where the debts are not satisfied by the settlor's 
only of the policies themselves, and it might better be argued that the proceeds, 
then, are still insulated. In a whole life policy, however, the decedent does in fact 
have control over the cash surrender value during his lifetime. If such policies were 
placed in or made payable to a revocable inter vivos trust, Reiser could easily be 
read as allowing creditors, absent a stahlte, to reach the proceeds at least up to their 
cash value. 
32 Professor Casner suggests that neither insurance nor employee death benefits 
should be reachable since the creditors could not have reached them during the 
settlor's lifetime. 1 A. CASNER, ESTATE PLANNING (4th ed. 1980) at 312. 
33 rd. at 327. No authorities are cited. 
34 C.L. c. 197, § 9, the so-called short statute of limitations. Cf. C. L. c. 197, 
§ 10, which allows later rued claims if the Supreme Judicial Court finds that "justice" 
and "equity" require it and the creditor is not guilty of "culpable neglect" in not 
presenting the claim in timely fashion. 
35 C.L. c. 197, § 9. 
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estate,36 there is no clear statutory protection to the trustee other than 
normal statutes of limitation applicable during the decedent's lifetime.37 
Creditors of the estate of the settlor, as distinguished from creditors 
of the settlor himself, would seem not to be protected by the Reiser rule. 
The basis for the holding in Reiser is an equitable, public policy rule 
that it is unfair for a settlor to have put such assets aut of the reach 
of his creditors while still enjoying them. Creditors of· the estate have 
no such complaint; they are on notice that any property or services 
extended to an estate are extended to an entity having limited assets. 
They are in a position to protect themselves by making, appropriate in-
quiries as to the extent of assets of the estate. 
Finally, the question arises concerning the implication of Reiser for 
the rights of a surviving spouse. It is well settled iJil Massachusetts 
that the statutory shares of a surviving spouse or children respecting 
assets passing by intestacy 38 and the surviving spouse's statutory share 
available upon waiver of the terms of a will 39 do not extend to assets 
disposed of during a decedent's lifetime, whether by gift or otherwise.40 
Indeed, it is clear that a spouse can intentionally deprive a surviving 
spouse and children of a share of his estate by transfe*ing assets to a 
revocable trust during his lifetime.41 The cases so holdibg were implic-
itly approved by Reiser.42 The theory of such cases is arguably different 
from that of the situation of a creditor of the decedent~ however. The 
basis for the ability of a spouse to make an inter vivos disposition of his 
property even intentionally as against his surviving spouse is the policy 
that a surviving spouse, unlike a creditor, has no claim during the dece-
dent spouse's lifetime over his property superior to the decedent's ab-
solute right to dispose of his property as he deems fit without the knowl-
edge or consent of his spouse.43 It is unlikely that Reiser, which is based 
on a fairly narrow public policy governing protection oif creditors, will 
be used successfully as a precedent for change in that theory. Such a 
change would seem to require a new definition of interspousal property 
36 The short statute of limitations itself essentially makes probate assets unavail-
able to satisfy claims. Another interesting question is whether the immunity of a 
special administrator from suit by creditors, C.L. c. 193, § 15, could be viewed as 
an unavailability of assets allowing creditors to proceed directly against the revocable 
trust. 
37 Ct. C.L. c. 260, § 11, governing contracts made by the trustee. 
38 C.L. c. 190, § 1. 
39 C.L. c. 191, § 15. 
40 Kerwin v. Donaghy, 317 Mass. 559, 571, 59 N.E.2d 299, 306 (1945); Dana v. 
Dana, 226 Mass. 297, 299, 115 N.E. 418 (1917); C. NEWHALL(, SE'ITLEMENT OF 
ESTATES, AND FIDUCIARY LAW IN MASSACHUSETTS § 211 (4th ed. 1958). 
41 317 Mass. at 571, 59 N.E.2d at 306. 
42 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 1037, 389 N.E.2d at 770. 
43 317 Mass. at 571, 59 N.E.2d at 306. 
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rights. It is more likely that the courts will await statutory develop-
ments.44 
§3.2. Short Statute of Limitations-Claim of Commonwealth. In 
Department of Public Welfare v. Anderson,1 the Supreme Judicial Court 
held that the so-called short statute of limitations for claims against an 
estate, section 9 of chapter 197 of the General Laws,2 applied to the 
commonwealth's claim for reimbursement for medical assistance pro-
vided the decedent, and, as a result, the claim was barred.3 The Court 
analyzed the limitations period in section 9, found it to be in the nature 
of a "nonclaim" statute, and adopted the majority rule that such a sta-
tute does apply to state claims unless the statute creating the claim pro-
vides otherwise.4 
In Anderson, the Department of Public Welfare had filed a notice of 
claim against an estate with the executor and with the probate court ten 
months after the executor gave his bond.5 The claim was for reimburse-
ment for medical assistance rendered to the decedent under section 16 
of chapter U8E of the General Laws.6 The Department also commenced 
suit on the same day in the Municipal Court for the City of Boston. 
The suit was subsequently removed to the superior court.7 The execu-
tor refused the claim on the ground that the nine month statutory period 
for filing claims had expired, and the commonwealth's claim was thus 
barred.s After paying other debts and expenses and distributing the 
assets, the executor moved for the allowance of his final account.9 The 
account was allowed, notwithstanding the objections of the Department.1o 
44 The. widow's allowance, C.L. c. 196, § 2, presents slightly a different problem 
in an estate with few probate assets and a funded revocable trust for the benefit of 
others. The allowance for necessaries is superior to debts, id., but is not really a 
debt of ilie settlor during his lifetime. It would be ironic to require debts of the 
settlor to be paid by the revocable trust and not allow senior claims equivalent treat-
ment. It might be that the courts, if confronted with the question, would view the 
widow's allowance as equivalent to a debt of the. settlor, akin to a requirement of 
support, and apply the Reiser rule anyway. 
§3.2. 1 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 31, 384 N.E.2d 628. 
2 The short statute of limitations applicable at the time was the section as appear-
ing in Acts of 1972, c. 246. It has been substantially revised by the Acts of 1976, 
c. 515, § 15, as amended by the Acts of 1979, c. 546, § 5. The issue raised in this 
case, however, would be equally applicable under the new version of § 9 of C.L. c. 
197. 
3 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 46, 384 N.E.2d at 636. 
4 ld. 
G ld. at 33, 384 N.E.2d at 630. 
6 ld. at 31, 384 N.E.2d at 629. 
7 ld. at 33, 384 N.E.2d at 630. 
8 ld. at 33-34, 384 N.E.2d at 630. 
9 ld. at 33-34, 384 N.E.2d at 630-31. 
10 ld. at 34, 384 N.E.2d at 631. 
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The Department appealed the judgment and applied for direct appellate 
review,u The superior court, in the Department's own action, also re-
ported several questions of law.12 The appeal and report were con-
solidated for hearing before the Supreme Judicial Court.13 
The Court disposed of the case by ruling that the Department's claim 
was barred by section 9 of chapter 197.14 In so doing, the Court employed 
a two-step analysis. It looked first to the nature of the debt to determine 
whether it belonged to the decedent or to the estate.15 Once deciding it 
was the decedent's debt and thus, absent some immunity applicable to 
the commonwealth, subject to the provisions of section 9 of chapter 197, 
the Court analyzed the nature of the limitation provisions of that sec-
tion.16 
The determination that the debt was that of the decedent hinged upon 
an analysis of the language of section 16 of chapter U8E.17 Under that 
section the Department of Public Welfare may recover from a decedent's 
estate funds for medical assistance rendered to the decedent during his 
lifetime.18 The recovery may be made only after the death of the sur-
viving spouse, if any, and at such time that the recipient has no surviving 
child who is under the age of twenty-one or who is blind or permanently 
and totally disabled.10 The Court construed the statute narrowly by 
noting that recovery against an estate is seen as an exception to an assist-
ance program,20 that the medical assistance was rendered during the 
decedent's lifetime,21 and that language of section 16 and its structure 
11 Id. at 31-32, 384 N.E.2d at 630. 
12 Id. at 34-35, 384 N.E.2d at 631. 
13 Id. at 32, 384 N.E.2d at 630. The Department requested relief for the first 
time before the full Court under C.L. c. 197, § 10, permitting the, Supreme Judicial 
Court, upon a bill filed in equity, to allow a creditor's claim if the creditor failed to 
prosecute it under c. 197, § 9, if "justice and equity require it:~ Because such a 
request must be heard in the first instance by a single justice, t~ Court held that 
the § 10 request was not properly before it and it would neither ~llow nor disallow 
the request. Id. at 35 n.2, 384 N.E.2d at 631 n.2. . 
14 [d. at 35, 384 N.E.2d at 631. 
15 If the debt is the decedent's, then § 9 applies unless a cleaf statement to the 
contrary appears in the statute giving rise to the relief; if, however, the debt is the 
estate's, § 9 does not apply unless a clear statement appears in the enabling statute. 
Id. at 38, 384 N.E.2d at 632. In the latter case, a longer period of limitation applies. 
C.L. c. 260, § 11. 
16 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 42, 384 N.E.2d at 634. 
17 Id. at 39-42, 384 N.E.2d at 632-34. 
18 The recipient must be 65 years of age or older at the time of assistance and 
there must be written approval of the Department. The Court disqussed whether the. 
Department met the requirement for written approval prior to the :commencement of 
a claim. [d. at 36 n.3, 384 N.E.2d at 631 n.3. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. at 39, 384 N.E.2d at 633. 
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did not suggest that the legislature intended the Department to have the 
status of a creditor of an estate. 22 It distinguished section 16 from an 
earlier recovery statute for relieved property taxes interpreted in Milford 
v. Casamassa. 23 
The decision concerning whether the commonwealth or its department 
was immune from application of section 9 of chapter 197 depended on 
whether this section was in the nature of a statute of limitations or a 
"nonclaim statute." 24 A statute of limitations is merely a limitation of 
remedies; it does not go to a creation of rights. It is an affirmative de-
fense which, if not pleaded, is comidered waived.25 Neither the federal 
government nor a state is subject to a statute of limitations unless it ex-
presses its consent to be so bound.20 A nonclaim statute, on the other 
hand, imposes a condition precedent to a right of recovery. Failure to 
meet the condition voids a claim, and such failure cannot be waived. 
Although inapplicable to claims of the federal government because of 
the supremacy clause,27 a nonclaim statute bars state claims even though 
there is no expression by a state legislature to be bound by it.28 
The Court did not thoroughly review its reasons for concluding that 
section 9 was a non-claim statute and for adopting the majority rule 20 
that such a statute bars state claims. It did note, however, that the 
requirements of section 9 are absolute and cannot be waived, which is 
one notable feature of a non-claim statute.30 By agreeing with the rea-
soning of other jurisdictions,31 the Court apparently also viewed the 
22 [d. at 42, 384 N.E.2d at 633. 
23 339 Mass. 702, 162 N.E.2d 284 (1959). 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 42, 384 
N.E.2d at 633. 
24 [d. at 42-46, 384 N.E.2d at 634-36. 
25 [d. at 45, 384 N.E.2d at 635. 
26 Boston v. Nielsen, 305 Mass. 429, 430, 26 N.E.2d 366 (1940). 
27 Taylor v. United States, 324 Mass. 639, 642, 88 N.E.2d 121 (1949), cert. 
denied, 338 U.S. 948 (1950). 
28 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 45, 384 N.E.2d at 635. 
29 Those jurisdictions adopting the majority rule either have been persuaded by 
the short statute of limitations' character as a non-claim statute, e.g., Reith v. County 
of Mountrail, 104 N.W. 2d 667 (N.D. 1960); Donnally v. Montgomery Welfare Bd., 
200 Md. 534, 92 A.2d 354 (1952); Bahr v. Zahm, 219 Ind. 297, 37 N.E.2d 942 
(1941), or by the fact that the purpose of such a statute is to expedite the settle-
ment of estates, e.g., State ex. reI. Cent. State Griffin Mem. Hosp. v. Reed, 493 P.2d 
815 (Okla. 1972); State v. Drake, 64 Ohio L. Abs. 177, 106 N.E.2d 91 (1952). 
Some states base their decision on both reasons. E.g., State v. Goldfarb, 160 Conn. 
320, 278 A.2d 818 (1971); State v. Estate of Crocker, 38 Ala. App. 306, 83 So. 2d 
261 (1955). 
30 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 46, 384 N.E.2d at 635. The requirements of G.L. c. 
197, § 9, are absolute and cannot be waived. See Nochemson v. Aronson, 279 Mass. 
278,282,181 N.E. 188, 190 (1932); but ct. KoHnke v. Maranhas, 1978 Mass. Adv. 
Sh. 1165, 375 N.E.2d 711. 
31 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 46, 384 N.E.2d at 635. 
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requirements of section 9 as bespeaking a condition precedent to recovery 
against an estate. It pOinted out that such an application furthered the 
purpose of section 9, which is to "expedite the settlement of estates and 
thereby protect the substantial interests of creditors as well as distrib-
utees." 32 Application of the statute to the commonwealth 33 in the con-
text of the reimbursement scheme for medical assistanc~ would satisfy 
these purposes without working an unnecessary hardship upon the De-
partment of Public Welfare.34 
Anderson raises one interesting practical problem. The Department 
of Public Welfare had argued that it had regularly brought actions against 
estates more than nine months after the approval of the bond,35 relying 
on a Boston Municipal Court 36 decision holding that settion 9 did not 
apply to the commonwealth. There may well be some accounts now 
pending or not yet prepared of executors who allowed such a claim, and 
this situation raises the question of whether such acti<;m would be a 
grounds for surcharge.37 As a result of this case, the legislature may now 
wish to provide expressly in statutes authorizing state claims against an 
estate whether section 9 is applicable to the commonwealth. It would be 
foolhardy to rely on the Court's interpretation that a particular statute 
makes the commonwealth a creditor of the estate as opposed to a creditor 
of the decedent, because once it finds the latter, section '9 will apply to 
the claim. 
One question of note raised by the superior court was left unanswered 
in the Court's decision. The Department had not agreed to have its 
claim for reimbursement determined by the probate coiIrt pursuant to 
32 [d. at 37, 384 N.E.2d at 632. See Stow v. Commissioner of Gorp. & Tax'n, 336 
Mass. 337, 341, 145 N.E.2d 720,722 (1957); Stebbins v. Scott, 172 Mass. 356, 362, 
52 N.E. 535, 538 (1899). 
33 The Department of Public Welfare is an agency of the commonwealth. C.L. 
c. 18, §l. The term "creditor" has been broadly defined. See N¢w England Trust 
Co. v. Spaulding, 310 Mass. 424, 430, 38 N.E.2d 672, 676 (1941). 
34 The Court may have been influenced by the fact that in this particular case 
the Department had initiated administrative review before the. executor had given 
bond. 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 46, 384 N.E.2d at 636. The commonwealth could 
also have sought relief pursuant to § 10 of chapter 197, see note 13 supra, or if the 
right to recover did not accrue until after the time limit in § 9 of chapter 197 lapsed, 
then under § 13 of chapter 197. 
35 Appellant's Application for Direct Appellate Review, App. Ct. No. 78-399, 
Suffolk Sup. Ct. No. 683084, at 14. 
36 Commonwealth v. Falzone, Adm., App. Div., B.M.C. Docket No. 352967 
(1975). 
37 If an account is allowed for the period .in which the payment was made, a 
beneficiary will likely not be able to reopen the account. Ct. National Academy of 
Sciences v. Cambridge Trust Co., 3 Mass. App. 314, 329 N.E.2d 144 (1975), aff'd, 
370 Mass. 303, 346 N.E.2d 879 (1976). 
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its "disputed claim" provisions.38 Its claim in the superior court was 
pending when the probate court entered a judgment allowing the execu-
tor's final account. Because the Department had notice, objected, and 
lost in the probate court, the superior court had asked whether the allow-
ance of the account was res judicata of the issues in the civil action.39 
The law appears to be that the allowance of the Anderson account was 
indeed res judicata in the civil action brought by the Department.4o 
§3.3. Wills and Trusts-Interpretation-Payment of Death Taxes-
Apportionment. If the death tax burden among probate and non-probate 
assets is not adequately set out in a decedent's will or by the governing 
instrument of other dispositive vehicles against which the tax is assessed, 
most states, including Massachusetts, by statute equitably apportion the 
tax burden among beneficiaries or entities subject to tax.1 Often, how-
ever, a decedent's will requires that all taxes on probate and non-probate 
assets be paid out of the probate estate. In such situations, Massachu-
setts law has scrupulously refused to impose any different allocation of 
the tax burden among beneficiaries of probate and non-probate assets, 
regardless of apparently anomalous results.2 
\Vhere the will is that of a decedent of a foreign state, the situation is 
even more difficult, because Massachusetts refuses to grant extraterritorial 
effect either to a foreign will provision or to a foreign apportionment 
statute which attempts to charge taxes against trust property located 
solely within the commonwealth.3 The reasoning is that the trustee is 
governed by, and the trust beneficiaries are the creatures of, Massachu-
setts trust law, which is not dictated by the law of other states or by 
wills of their decedents. Thus, where the provisions of a Massachusetts 
trust do not require contribution to the taxes owed by an estate, the 
38 Under § 2 of c. 197 a creditor may assent to have its claim heard in probate 
court, but absent that, in allowing an account, a probate court in effect passes on 
the validity of a claim. See C. NEWHALL, SETTLEMENT OF ESTATES AND FIDUCIARY 
LAw IN MASSACHUSE'ITS § 183 (4th ed. 1958). 
39 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 35, 384 N.E.2d at 631. 
40 See Old Colony Trust Co. v. Mabbett, 334 Mass. 412, 416, 135 N.E.2d 914, 
917 (1956). 
§3.3. 1 E.g., C.L. c. 65A, § 5. Federal law yields to state law in apportion-
ment matters. Riggs v. Del Drago, 317 U.S. 95 (1942). Typically such laws 
apportion pro rata to value of the entity. See C.L. c. 65A, § 5. See also UNIFORM 
PROBATE CODE § 3-916 (1969); UNIFORM ESTATE TAX ApPORTIONMENT ACT § 2 
(1958); UNIFORM ESTATE TAX ApPORTIONMENT ACT § 2 (1964). All such statutes 
allow the decedent to change the disposition by will. 
2 E.g., Whitbeck v. Aldrich, 341 Mass. 326, 169 N.E.2d 882 (1960); Martin v. 
New England Deaconess Hosp., 328 Mass. 259, 103 N.E.2d 240 (1952). 
3 Warfield v. Merchants Nat'l Bank of Boston, 337 Mass. 14, 147 N.E.2d 809 
(1958); Isaacson v. Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 325 Mass. 469, 91 N.E.2d 
334 (1950). 
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executor or administrator of an out-of-state decedent ~ill be unsuccess-
ful in coming to Massachusetts to enforce contribution regardless of the 
terms of the will or the law of the foreign jurisdiction.4 : It should follow, 
a fortiori, that where a will of a foreign decedent directs that taxes on 
probate and non-probate assets be paid out of probate assets, the execu-
tor could not seek contribution from trust assets having a situs in Massa-
chusetts. A problem arises, however, if the Massachusetts trust also 
provides that all such taxes be paid out of trust property. 
This bizarre situation was faced by the Supreme Judicial Court in First 
National Bank of Mount Dora v. Shawmut Bank of Boston, N.A.5 Mount 
Dora concerned the interpretation of an estate plan of a ,Florida decedent. 
The estate plan consisted of a funded Massachusetts reviooable trust 6 and 
a will subsequently executed in Connecticut.7 The trust directed that 
the trustees pay all estate and inheritance taxes imposed by reason of 
the death of the decedent.s The will, admitted to probate in Florida, 
on the other hand, directed the executor to pay the same taxes from, the 
residue of the estate, without apportionment or charge against "thei re-
spective devisees, legatees, beneficiaries, transferees or other recipients" 
or against any property passing to any of them.9 The Florida executor 
4 Id. 
5 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1329, 389 N.E.2d 1002. 
6 The trust was created in Massachusetts and trustees were a Massachusetts trust 
company and a Massachusetts resident. 
7 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1329, 389 N.E.2d 1002. The will was executed in 
Connecticut when the decedent was domiciled there. 
S As soon as practicable after the death of the donor, the i trustees shall de-
termine ... all estate, transfer, inheritance, legacy and suc~ssion taxes ... 
on or with respect to any property includible under any such law in the gross 
estate of the donor, or any property (or the transmitting or receiving thereof) 
passing under the will of the donor or any codicil thereto, or otherwise payable 
by reason of the death of the donor on or with respect to any transfer or other 
disposition of property at any time made by her . . .. The trustees shall, 
out of the principal of the trust property, pay the whole of isaid aggregate as 
follows: ( i) to the donor's executors or administrators to suc):J. (if any) extent 
and on such terms as the trustees shall in their reasonable i discretion see fit, 
and (ii) to the extent not paid to such executors or administrators, to the re-
spective creditor or public officer who is entitled to receive any portion thereof 
and empowered to give a valid receipt therefor. 
1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1329-30 n.2, 389 N.E.2d at 1003 n.2. , 
9 I further direct that all legacy, succession, inheritance, tr~nsfer, and estate 
taxes, levied or assessed upon or with respect to any property iwhich is included 
as part of my gross estate for the purpose of any such tax, sh~ll be paid by my 
executor out of my estate in the same manner as an expense of administration 
and shall not be prorated or apportioned among or charged against the respective 
devisees, legatees, beneficiaries, transferees, or other recipients nor charged 
against any property passing or which may have passed to any of them, and 
that my executor shall not be entitled to reimbursement fori any such tax or 
any portion thereof from any such person. 
Id. at 1330-31 n.3, 389 N.E.2d at 1003-04 n.3. 
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brought an action in Massachusetts probate court seeking a judgment 
requiring the trustees to carry out the directions of the trust instrument 
and pay all of the decedent's estate and inheritance taxes. The trustees 
objected to payment on the grounds that the will was controlling, and it 
placed the entire burden of estate and inheritance taxes on the residue 
of the estate.10 
The probate court ruled that where a conflict existed between the 
"clear" terms of the will and a prior executed trust, the will was the final 
expression of the decedent's intent, and the estate must bear the burden 
of the tax unless the will indicates a contrary intent or there is a statute 
in aid of the executor's contention.n The probate court excluded evi-
dence offered by the plaintiff concerning the value of assets included in 
the gross estate for tax purposes and also excluded testimony from the 
draftsman of the will. The probate court then entered judgment against 
the executor, who appealed, and the Supreme Judicial Court granted 
direct appellate review.12 The Court reversed,13 holding that the trial 
court should have admitted not only evidence of the nature and value of 
the assets included in the estate 14 but also evidence from the draftsman 
as well. 
The Court noted that there was no apparent statutory solution to the 
dilemma because, if the will were to be read as directing no apportion-
ment of estate and inheritance taxes to non-probate assets, the Florida 
apportionment statute would not likely overrule that direction. The 
Court implied that, in any event, the Florida statute would not be bind-
ing on Massachusetts trustees.15 Moreover, neither the Massachusetts 
apportionment law which applies only to Massachusetts decedents,16 
nor federal law which yields to state law on such matters,17 applied to 
resolve the conflict. 
A similar conflict existed with respect to the payment of debts and certain ex-
penses, but at trial the trustee conceded liability for indemnification for such items, 
apparently because the no reimbursement language. in the will did not specifically 
refer to these items. 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1331, 389 N.E.2d at 1004. 
10 ld. at 1330, 389 N.E.2d at 1004. 
11 ld. at 1331, 389 N.E.2d at 1004. 
12 ld. The trustees cross-appealed arguing that the trust should not have been 
admitted. ld. at 1331 nA, 389 N.E.2d at 1004 nA. 
13 ld. at 1331-32, 389 N.E.2d at 1004. 
14 The decedent's gross estate was approximately $2,285,000 of which only 
$385,000 was attributable to the Florida probate estate and $1,100,000 was in the 
trust. The balance was apparently situated in New Jersey. The federal estate tax 
was $437,000 which exceeded the entire probate estate. ld. at 1332, 1333, 389 
N.E.2d at 1005. 
15 ld. at 1335, 389 N.E.2d at 1006, citing Warfield v. Merchants Nat'l. Bank of 
Boston, 337 Mass. 14, 147 N.E.2d 809 (1958), and Isaacson v. Boston Safe Deposit 
& Trust Co., 325 Mass. 469, 91 N.E.2d at 334 (1950). 
16 G.L. c. 65A, § 5. 
17 Riggs v. Del Drago, 317 U.S. 95 (1942). 
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The Court thus determined that the conflict with respect to the trus-
tees' obligation to contribute or th~ executors' obligation to pay without 
contribution must be resolved on the basis of the intent of the decedent-
settlor. Such intent, however, was not necessarily to be determined 
solely by the language of the will: 
[W]e see no reason why the provisions of a will must be given 
precedence over those conflicting provisions of an inter vivos trust 
which are to become operative at the settlor's death, particularly 
when the administration of nonprobate assets is involved. In to-
day's estate planning, it is not reasonable to conclude that a will is 
always of greater significance than an instrument creating an inter 
vivos trust. IS 
Since the two instruments were, according to the Court, of equal signifi-
cance, and since extrinsic evidence would be admissible to resolve a con-
flict if the two conflicting provisions appeared in a single document, such 
evidence should also be admitted where conflict appears in these two 
instruments of equal weight.19 Here, the Court reasoned, evidence of the 
circumstances known to the decedent-settlor could be particularly in-
structive in achieving the ultimate goal of recognizing and carrying out 
her intentions, especially when an illogical result would occur if the cir-
cumstances were not considered.20 
The Court also observed that extrinsic evidence could be helpful in 
ascertaining which jurisdiction's law might ultimately be used in resolving 
the conflict. Given prior case law 21 and the fact that the trust itself 
specified interpretation by Massachusetts internal law,22 it would seem 
on the surface that Massachusetts law would apply. Nevertheless, the 
Court found that a "significant choice of law question" existed.23 It 
noted recent criticism of the refusal by situs jurisdictions, such as Massa-
chusetts, to apply the law of the domicile of the decedent and cited sev-
eral jurisdictions which now apply the law of the domicile.24 The Court 
suggested that it may be appropriate to determine and apply the law of 
the jurisdiction with which the decedent had the greatest contact at 
significant times, such as her domicile (Connecticut) at the execution 
18 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1336, 389 N.E. N.E.2d at 1006. But see C.L. c. 191, 
§ 1A(2). 
19 ld. at 1336-37, 389 N.E.2d at 1006. 
20 ld. at 1337, 389 N.E.2d at 1006. 
21 See cases cited in note 3 supra. The Court also cites several decisions from 
other jurisdictions which also apply the law of the situs of the trust. 1979 Mass. 
Adv. Sh. at 1338, 389 N.E.2d at 1007. 
22 ld. at 1341, 389 N.E.2d at 1008. 
23 ld. at 1338, 389 N.E.2d at 1007. 
24 See id. at 1339, 389 N.E.2d at 1007, 1008. 
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of both instruments or perhaps the law of the jurisdiction which the 
decedent expected to be applied.25 While it declined to speculate on 
which rule it would adopt if the issue were fully developed and presented, 
it clearly opened the door to a reconsideration of its position.26 
The Court's acceptance of evidence of the testatrix' knowledge of facts 
and circumstances at the execution of the will is consistent in theory with 
prior law applied in ambiguity cases. 27 In this instance, however, the 
admission of the conflicting document 2S itself seems to create an ambi-
guity in the otherwise clear language of the instrument. This result is 
an apparent departure from traditional rulings.2il The Court, therefore, 
ostensibly has recognized and approved such a departure 30 when there 
are two or more instruments in the same estate plan, even if not simul-
taneously executed, even though traditional parol evidence principles 
would at least limit such a departure to contemporaneous documents. 
The import of the decision appears to extend beyond evidentiary issues, 
however. The Court seems to have explicitly attributed to the revocable 
trust the same significance given the will in an estate plan, at least for 
purposes of interpretation. In practice, the trust has possessed this equiv-
alent status for planning purposes for some time. In formalizing this 
status, however, the Court may have superseded a statutory rule of con-
25 Id. at 1341,389 N.E.2d at 1008. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF COl\'FLICT OF 
LAws § 268(2)(b) (1971). 
26 The choice of law issue in the Mount Dora situation could be crucial. There 
is no apparent ~1assachusetts precedent dealing with a direct conflict between a will 
and a trust. The Court cites two Florida lowcr court cases which appear to inter-
pret Florida law as giving precedence to the will, 1979 ~1ass. Adv. Sh. at 1339-40 
n.9, 389 N.E.2d at 1008 n.9, although the Court seems unimpressed. Id. Connecticut 
appears to favor the will as well. See Union and New Haven Trust Co. v. Sullivan, 
116 A.2d 908, 142 Conn. 685 (1955). Given the additional formalities of a will 
and, at least in this instance the fact that the will is the later document, it seems 
likely that the Massachusetts court would rule, even under ~1assachusetts law, that 
the provisions of the will take precedence in the event of a conflict unresolved by 
proof of intent. See G.L. c. 191, § 1A(2). 
27 See Smith, The Admissibility of Extrinsic Evidence in Will Interpretation Cases, 
64 MASS. L. REV. 123, 123-25 (1979), and citations therein. 
28 The posture of the evidentiary issues in Mount Dora is curious. The trustees 
objected to the admission into evidence of the trust on the ground that the will was 
clear. The executor apparently introduced the will itself. It would seem more 
likely for the executor to put the trust in evidence and then object to an attempt 
by the trustee to admit the will in defense on the grounds that the terms of the 
trust were clear on their face. 
2U E.g. Gustafson v. Svenson, 373 Mass. 273, 366 N.E.2d 761 (1977). 
30 The Court suggested one possible resolution of the conflict which might be 
found after evidence was taken-interpreting the term "transferees, or other re-
cipients" (see note 9 supra) in the will provision denying contribution as perhaps 
not including an inter vivos trust. 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1337-38 n.8, 389 N.E.2d 
1006-07 n.8. In doing so it may have identified an ambiguity in the will which it 
can use to distinguish this case from future attempts to open up the evidentiary rules 
to allow admission of evidence designed to create ambiguities. 
16
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1979 [1979], Art. 6
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1979/iss1/6
56 1979 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW §3.4 
struction in section 1A(2) of chapter 191 of the General Laws. This rule 
provides that the intention of a testator "as expressed in his will" shall 
control the legal effect of his dispositions . . . ." 31 In addition, the 
Court's interpretation brings into question the continued policy of the 
law to require different formalities in execution of both. 
§3.4. Trust-Settlor's Intent-Funding. During the Survey year the 
Appeals Court decided another case involving interpretation of a settlor's 
intent. In Bourgeois v. Hurley,1 the Appeals Court was required to inter-
pret two simultaneously executed documents in order to ascertain first, 
whether a settlor intended to transfer certain securities to a revocable 
trust and second, whether his intent was effectuated. The decedent had 
executed a Declaration of Trust which stated that the settlor "is about 
to transfer and deliver certain of his property to himself . . . and his 
wife ... as It]rustees." 2 Appended to that trust was a typewritten docu-
ment entitled "Schedule A" itemizing certain securities, each page of 
which was initialed and which was Signed on the final page.3 Schedule 
A was not mentioned in the body of the trust instrument, nor did Sched-
ule A refer to the trust. 4 On the same day that the trust and Schedule A 
were signed, the settlor executed a will which made reference to the 
trust and deSignated the trustees as beneficiaries of the residue of the 
estate.5 
At the settlor's death, the executor found the securities itemized on 
Schedule A in the decedent's safe deposit box. The securities were still 
registered in the decedent-settlor's name as an individual, never having 
been endorsed either to the trustees or in blank. G The court inferred 
that no related powers of attorney had been executed. 7 The executor 
claimed that the securities had never been transferred to the trustees 
and therefore remained part of the probate estate. The parties initiated 
an action in the Supreme Judicial Court to ascertain the ownership of 
the securities, and the Court transferred the case to the Appeals Court. 8 
The Appeals Court held for the trustees. ll 
31 C.L. c. 191, § 1A(2). 
§3.4. 1 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Allv. Sh. 1635, 392 N.E.2d 1061. 
2 ld. at 1636, 392 N.E.2d at 1063. 
3 ld. 
4 ld. at 1636-37, 392 N.E.2d at 1063. 
5 ld. at 1637, 392 N.E.2d at 1063. 
G ld. at 1637, 392 N.E.2d at 1064. 
7 ld. 
8 ld. at 1635, 392 N.E.2d at 1063. There were apparently extrinsic tax con-
siderations involved which prompted the parties to secure judicial resolution of the 
question. 
9 ld. at 1643, 392 N.E.2d at 1066. 
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The court found that the settlor, by his statement in the trust and by 
the listing of securities in Schedule A, had adequately expressed his in-
tention to make the transfer of the listed securities to the trust.lO Ac-
cording to the court, the settlor clearly intended to give Schedule A legal 
effect, since it had been initialed, signed, and dated at the same time as 
the trust and appended to the document declaring the trustY The 
settlor's intent was further shown by evidence that the settlor and his 
spouse had treated the securities as property held in trust, by depositing 
all dividends and interest in a trust checking account and by filing 
corresponding fiduciary income tax returns.12 
The court rejected the executor's argument that, even if the settlor had 
intended to transfer those securities, he was required to take the addi-
tional step of endorsing over the securities, or executing a power of 
attorney, or take some further act of "transfer and delivery," in order 
effectively to complete the transfer to the truSt.1ll The court acknowl-
edged that the executor's contention might have merit if one were to 
look solely to the Declaration of Trust, which merely stated that the 
settlor was about to transfer the securities.14 The court found, however, 
that the simultaneous execution of the Declaration and the appended 
Schedule A indicated that the settlor intended both documents to be 
read together as a single legal instrument.1s It also found that the 
settlor intended, by executing Schedule A and appending it to the trust, 
to effect the transfer without further formalities.10 Stating that the law 
has historically allowed a trust of securities to be created by a simple 
declaration to that effect,li the court held that the combined declaration 
of intent in the trust instrument and the identification of the assets to 
be so held on Schedule A, where intended to be sufficient, was in fact 
adequate to effect the necessary delivery for trust purposes,18 
In at least two respects, reliance on the Bourgeois holding may be mis-
placed. First, where the settlor is not a trustee, it would evidently be 
10 ld. at 1641, 392 N.E.2d at 1065. 
11 ld. at 1640, 392 N.E.2d at 1065. 
12 ld. at 1638, 392 N.E.2d at 1064. Authority for subsequent actions tending to 
show intention was found in Rizzo v. Cunningham, 303 Mass. 16, 21, 20 N.E.2d 
471, 474 (1939). 
13 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 1639-40, 392 N.E.2d at 1064-65. 
14 ld. at 1640, 392 N .E.2d at 1065. 
15 ld. 
16 ld. at 1641-42, 392 N.E.2d at 1065. 
17 ld. at 1641, 392 N.E.2d at 1065, citing Barnette v. McNulty, 21 Ariz. App. 
127, 516 P.2d 583 (1973); Rock v. Rock, 309 Mass. 44, 33 N.E.2d 973 (1941); 
Locke v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 140 N.Y. 135,35 N.E. 578 (1893); BOGERT, 
TRUSTS & TRUSTEES § 142(b) (2d ed. 1979); and the RESTATEMENT SECOND OF 
TRUSTS § 17(a), Comment (a) (1959). It should be noted that these authorities 
are limited to cases where the settlor is also the trustee. 
18 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 1641, 1642, 392 N.E.2d at 1065. 
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highly imprudent to fund a trust by relying on the mere identification 
of assets in or attached to a trust as was done in Bourgeois. Such reli-
ance would be counter to the authority governing oral declarations of 
trust, relied upon in part by the court, which applies only to cases where 
the settlor transfers property to himself as trustee.19 Second, because 
of the practical problem of proving intent, it would likewise be im-
prudent to rely on Bourgeois even where the settlor is trustee, especially 
where it is essential to establish the time or fact of funding.20 To avoid 
any such questions, prudent draftsmen should at the very least do the 
following: ( 1) use language in their trusts stating that the settlor. has 
transferred or is about to transfer to the trustee the property listed on 
the appended schedule, (2) assure that the execution of the trust is 
accompanied either by physical delivery to the trustee of the assets 
in form legally sufficient to transfer title or by the delivery of legally 
sufficient deeds or assignments of property not physically delivered, and 
(3) have the trustee acknowledge receipt by a dated statement in the 
trust, on the schedule or separately. 
§3.5. Trustees Powers-Funding Marital Deduction Distributions in 
Kind-Valuation. In the Survey year, the Supreme Judicial Court ren-
dered another in a series of decisions interpreting terms of a trust or 
will so as to preserve an estate tax marital deduction.1 In Pastan v. 
Pastan,2 the issue was whether powers in a will purporting to give the 
executors discretion to choose and to value property to be distributed 
in the funding of a formula marital deduction trust created a non-deduc-
tible terminable interest. 3 The Court interpreted the powers so as to 
be consistent with the Internal Revenue Service rules governing "in 
kind" funding of marital gifts and the valuation of assets used. 
19 See note 17 supra. 
20 One obvious example is the timing of funding of a Clifford trust, requiring, for 
effectively shifting income tax liability, a transfer for at least ten years. I.R.C. § 673. 
§3.5. 1 Mazzola v. Myers, 363 Mass. 625, 296 N.E.2d 481 (1973) (interpreting 
a trustee's power to retain non-income prodUcing assets); Putnam v. Putnam, 366 
Mass. 261 (1974), 316 N.E.2d 729 (interpreting a trustee's power to settle future 
interests). Both are discussed in Slizewski, Trusts and Estates, 1975 ANN. SURV. 
MASS. LAW § 5.4, at 81-86; First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. First Nat'l Bank of 
Boston, 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1099, 375 N.E.2d 1185 (interpreting intent to qualify 
for marital deduction as precluding apportionment of taxes to marital trust); Boston 
Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. The Children's Hosp., 370 Mass. 719, 351 N.E.2d 848 
(1976) (apportionment of inheritance taxes). See also Babson v. Babson, 1977 
Mass. Adv. Sh. 2759, 371 N .E.2d 430, where the Court inferred the intent of the 
testator to take the maximum marital deduction. 
2 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1342, 390 N.E.2d 253. 
3 Id. I.R.C. § 2056 ( b) denies the marital deduction where the interest passing 
to the surviving spouse is terminable and where upon the termination or failure of 
the terminable interest the interest passes to or for the benefit of a person other 
than the spouse. 
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In Rev. Proc. 64-19 4 the Internal Revenue Service prescribed the 
conditions under which the estate tax marital deduction would be al-
lowed in cases where, under the terms of the governing instrument or 
local law, a fiduciary is empowered to satisfy a pecuniary bequest or 
transfer in trust to or for the benefit of a decedent's surviving spouse 
with assets other than cash. The problem addressed was that of fund-
ing a marital deduction pecuniary gift using assets valued at their fed-
eral estate tax value, even though the assets used may have significantly 
depreciated in value by the time the gift was funded. The concern was 
that if a fiduciary had the discretion to fund the marital bequest with 
property at estate tax values even though in fact the property had de-
preciated substantially, in effect the fiduciary had the discretion to allow 
the surviving spouse the actual benefit of only a portion of the marital 
deduction amount. Such discretion to deprive the spouse of some of 
the property qualifying for the marital deduction creates, in the Service's 
view, a disqualifying terminable interest.5 On a practical level, funding 
the bequest with property at estate tax values could produce a wind-
fall for the taxpayers by diverting to a non-marital trust property value 
which had received the benefit of a marital deduction. This technique 
would allow taxation on that diverted property value to be eliminated 
both at the death of the decedent and at the death of the surviving spouse, 
while still providing the surviving spouse with an income tax basis for 
property actually received equal to the full federal estate tax value.6 
In Rev. Proc. 64-19 the Service ruled that it would allow a pecuniary 
marital deduction in the full amount when funded with property in 
kind only under two circumstances. The governing instrument or local 
law must require either: (1) that the fiduciary satisfy the pecuniary 
4 1964-1 C.B. 682. 
5 Suppose, for example, that the decedent's estate after debts and expenses 
amounts, at estate tax values, to $500,000, $250,000 in appreciating securities and 
$250,000 in depreciating securities. Use of the maximum marital deduction would 
require a gift of $250,000 to the spouse. If at time of distribution the depreciating 
securities declined in value to $150,000 and the appreciating securities increased in 
value to $300,000, the executor, absent the rules of Rev. Proc. 64-19 could, if the 
will or local law permitted, fund the marital deduction using only the depreciating 
securities valued at estate tax values and thereby satisfy the gift with property 
worth only $150,000 at the time of distribution. Thus the spouse would never have 
control of $100,000 of property qualifying for marital deduction. While it is true 
that the same result would have occurred had the same securities been distributed 
immediately and had the spouse retained them, at least the spouse would have had 
the option to dispose of them before their depreciation. 
6 The excess inchoate gain in the property passing to the non-marital trust could 
then be eliminated, if the trust provides for discretionary payments of income, by 
distributing the low basis securities in kind as income to beneficiaries in lieu of cash. 
Since the value of such securties is included in ordinary income to the beneficiaries, 
the beneficiaries' basis is increased to fair market value at date of distribution. See 
Treas. Reg. § 1.661 (a)-2(f) (1956). 
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gift with cash or property having an aggregate fair market value as of 
the date or dates of distribution amounting to no less than the amount 
of the pecuniary bequest as finally determined for federal estate tax 
purposes; or (2) that the fiduciary distribute assets in satisfaction of the 
pecuniary bequest fairly representative of appreciation or depreciation 
in the value of all property thus available for distribution in the satis-
faction of such pecuniary bequest or transfer.7 This latter approach is 
often referred to as "ratable sharing" of appreciation or depreciation 
among beneficiaries. 
In Pastan, the will in question required that the decedent's property, 
after payment of funeral and administrative expenses, be divided into 
two shares. 8 The first share was to be an amount equal to fifty percent 
of the decedent's adjusted gross estate as determined for estate tax pur-
poses and was to be distributed to a standard, otherwise qualified, mar-
ital deduction trust for the benefit of the surviving spouse.9 The balance 
of the property, after deduction of a cash legacy for a son, went to a 
non-marital trust with income for life to the surviving spouse and discre-
tionary use by the trustees of prinCipal for her or for the decedent's 
children and grandchildren.10 The will gave the executors the power 
"to make any division or distribution required under the terms of this 
will in kind or in money" and to "allot to any part or share such stock, 
securities or other property, real or personal, as to them seems proper 
in their absolute judgment, and their judgment as to the value of such 
stock, securities, or other property so allocated shall be conclusive on 
all parties." 11 The Internal Revenue Service disallowed the marital 
deduction in part, apparently reasoning that the granted powers con-
stituted the power to distribute assets in kind to fund the marital trust 
at federal estate tax values, despite a depreciation in value at the time 
of distribution or perhaps at some other arbitrary value.12 It found that 
such a power created a disqualifying terminable feature since it violated 
the standards of Rev. Proc. 64-19.13 The executors brought a petition 
7 Rev. Proc. 64-19, § 2.02, 1964-1 C.B. 682. Thus, in the hypothetical at note 
5 supra, the fiduciary would have been required either to choose a combination of 
assets worth $250,000 at the time of distribution, leaving non-marital gifts worth 
$200,000 less taxes, or to select assets for both trusts which shared ratably the 
depreciation and appreciation. 
8 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1343, 390 N.E.2d at 254. 
9 ld. at 1344, 390 N.E.2d at 255. The income was to be paid monthly to the 
spouse during her lifetime with power in the trustees to distribute principal to he'r 
in their discretion, and the spouse had a general testamentary power of appointment. 
ld. 
10 ld. 
11 ld. at 1348, 390 N.E.2d at 256. 
12 ld. at 1342-43, 390 N.E.2d at 254. 
13 1964-1 C.B. 682. 
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in the probate court for construction of the pertinent clauses of the will 
so as to obtain a ruling of construction under Massachusetts law which 
would be binding upon the Internal Revenue Service.14 The probate 
court reported the questions to the Appeals Court and the Supreme 
Judical Court granted direct appellate review.15 
The Supreme Judicial Court at the outset analyzed the executors' 
powers under two rules of construction. The first was the doctrine of 
Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Stone,16 which adopted the general 
textbook rule for valuation of assets used to fund distributions absent 
specific instructions in the instrument: "A trustee in distributing the 
trust property in kind . . . must make the division in accordance with 
the fair market value of the property at the time of distribution." 17 
Absent any other guidance, then, this rule would require executors to 
use date of distribution values in funding the marital gifts. The second 
rule employed was the general rule that, despite wording which on its 
face might give a fiduciary a broad, even arbitrary, power in making 
valuations for distributions, a fiduciary in funding distributions must 
value property by exercising "an honest, objective judgment, which in 
practice will mean a reasonable judgment corresponding to reality, and 
in the case of traded-in properties will doubtless mean a judgment in 
terms of market values." 18 
The Court proceeded to point to some additional language in the 
trust instrument which demonstrated the apparent intent on the part 
of the testator that all fiduciary powers be construed so as to assure 
qualification for the estate tax marital deduction.19 The will required 
all taxes to be paid out of the non-marital share.20 Moreover, the will 
contained a specific direction that "[i]n no event shall any property or 
interest be allocated to this [marital] bequest of the residue of my estate 
which is a 'terminable interest' ... " and also seemed specifically to sub-
ordinate the power to value property to this limitation.21 The Court 
14 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1343, 390 N.E.2d at 254. The petition was brought 
under the doctrine of Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, (1967). 
See Babson v. Babson, 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2759, 371 N.E.2d 430, for a discussion 
of the authority to decide such issues in a quasi-adversary proceeding. As is typically 
the case, the Internal Revenue Service was notified of the proceedings and declined 
to participate. 
15 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1343, 390 N.E.2d at 254. 
16 348 Mass. 345, 203 N.E.2d 547 (1965). 
17 Id. at 352, 203 N.E.2d at 551. See also SCOTT, LAW OF TRUSTS § 347.6 (3d ed. 
1967); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 347, Comment h (1959). 
18 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1348-49, 390 N.E.2d at 256-57, and cases and texts 
cited therein. 
19 Id. at 1349, 390 N.E.2d at 256. 
20 Id. at 1345, 390 N.E.2d at 255. 
21 Id. at 1349, 390 N.E.2d at 257. 
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concluded that "[a]lthough these quoted clauses are not artful, they do 
bespeak an intent to avoid any interpretation that would jeopardize the 
marital deduction." 22 
By interjecting the tax objectives of the testator into its interpretation, 
the Court confronted the possible interpretation that the executors could 
use the "ratable sharing" approach in choosing assets to fund the trust 
rather than date of death valuation, since that interpretation would also 
meet the tax objectives. 23 The Court resolved this possibly self-created 
issue by looking to the language of the marital gift which, the Court 
said, was a statement of a pecuniary amount.24 Such a statement itself 
indicated an election of the date of distribution valuation approach, 
since the ratable sharing approach would tend to convert an apparent 
pecuniary gift into a fractional share gift. 2" The Court then stated that 
absent such an indication of a specific, defined amount for the marital 
trust, equity might suggest a ratable sharing of appreciation and de-
preciation among the beneficiaries.2c 
In construing the will so as to save the marital deduction, the Court 
followed a consistent pattern established in previous cases.27 Draftsmen 
in Massachusetts can continue to take some comfort that the vagaries 
of Internal Revenue Service interpretations of powers in instruments 
will not be fatal for estate tax purposes where the instrument contains 
an expressed intention that the settlor or testator intends to qualify 
fully for the estate tax benefit involved. The decision seems to reinforce 
the desirability of "bootstrap" saving clauses for marital deduction gifts 
and other tax sensitive provisions. The very existence of continued 
Internal Revenue Service attack on imprecisely drafted or inappropriate 
technical provisions, however, reaffirms the need for attention to choice 
of language and careful scrutiny of "boilerplate" provisions and their 
suitability to important tax oriented dispositions or powers. 
While the result of Pastan seems to be correct, it remains difficult to 
justify that portion of the holding distinguishing the permissible valua-
tion methods based upon the concept of a testator's intent. On technical 
matters such as whether a distribution should be made at estate tax 
22 ld. 
23 Rev. Proc. 64-19, § 2.02, 1964-1 C.B. 682. 
24 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1343-44, 390 N.E.2d at 254 (50% of the adjusted 
gross estate). 
25 ld. at 1350, 390 N.E.2d at 257. 
26 ld. at 1350-51 390 N.E.2d at 258. The Court felt that the surviving spouse's 
status as a beneficiary of both trusts assisted its conclusion, as otherwise the ratable 
sharing approach might have more equitable appeal. ld. at 1350 n.15, 390 N.E.2d at 
257-58 n.15. 
27 See note 1 supra. 
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values or at market values current at time of distribution or by choosing 
property fairly representative of appreciation and depreciation, it seems 
intellectually dishonest to suggest that testators are sophisticated enough 
to know which approach they would prefer and indeed that even most 
draftsmen are both conscious of the choice and careful to explain the 
alternatives to the testator. vVhile tax objectives in general are an 
appropriate consideration in defining or delineating fiduciary powers, a 
testator in a situation like Pastan cannot realistically be expected to 
intend anything more precise than full qualification for the estate tax 
marital deduction rules. 
The analysis could have been Simplified. The Court could have 
pOinted out that the power of the trustee to value the property for pur-
poses of distributiQn can only be exercised in a fiduciary capacity. That 
capacity would be restricted by the confines of traditional and regular 
fiduciary principles to further the purposes of the trust for the benefit 
of the beneficiaries, which, in this instance, means using reasoned 
opinions of value as of the valuation date. It could then have stated 
that the proper valuation date, since no date was specified, was the date 
of distribution under the general common law rule. Such a straight-
forward holding under ordinary rules of construction would have saved 
the taxpayer's position without interjecting into the case the ratable 
sharing problem. Since, for federal tax purposes, no administrative 
provisions in a will can be viewed more broadly than state law views 
them for administration purposes,28 the Internal Revenue Service would 
be required to interpret the will as prOViding for valuation of property 
distributed to the marital trust as of time of distribution. Such a 
valuation approach meets the requirements of Rev. Proc. 64-19, and the 
discretion in valuation at that date given to the executor is clearly 
within the Internal Revenue Service rules governing reasonable discre-
tions as they relate to the marital deduction. 29 
The Court seems to have felt compelled by language in earlier cases 
to go beyond rules of construction and delve into the issue of ratable 
sharing. These cases, which dealt with trustees' discretion as to valua-
tions, suggest that a fiduciary cannot make valuation decisions so as to 
favor one benefiCiary at the expense of another.30 Such language read 
in its broadest light could suggest that, absent a contrary intent, a 
ratable sharing of depreCiation or appreciation might be called for in 
28 Old Colony Trust Co. v. United States, 423 F.2d 601 (1st Cir. 1970). 
29 Rev. Rul. 69-56, 1969-1 C.B. 224. 
30 See Old Colony Trust Co. v. Silliman, 352 Mass. 6, 10, 223 N.E.2d 504, 507 
(1967); Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Stone, 348 Mass. 345, 350, 203 N.E.2d 
547,552 (1965). 
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all distributions. To resolve this potential ambiguity in the law, the 
Court looked for and found a contrary intent in the statement of the 
fixed pecuniary amount. The cases cited by the Court, however, do not 
overrule the general date of distribution rule; indeed one of them is 
Stone itself. Their language merely reinforces the fiduciary limits on 
valuation that the Court has identified. The problem of opening up 
the ratable sharing possibility is that it still leaves the door open for 
the Internal Revenue Service to argue in an even less precisely drafted 
instrument, especially in a case where the spouse does not benefit from 
the non-marital share,3t that the executor might be able to choose either 
the date of distribution or the ratable sharing approach. Placing that 
choice with the fiduciary would itself disqualify the marital deduction.32 
What is clear from Pastan, however, is that a precisely worded pecu-
niary amount gift will require date of distribution valuation absent a 
contrary specification in the instrument. Given the usual periods of 
administration and the post-death income tax advantages which can 
be had by extending periods of administration and timing of the funding 
of the marital trust or marital gifts, often over a period of years, it 
behooves draftsmen, in the face of Pastan, to consider at the drafting 
stage whether date of distribution valuations or ratable sharing is more 
appropriate. This choice is particularly important where the identities 
of beneficiaries or the kinds of assets, such as non-marketable securities 
or small business holdings, might make a ratable sharing approach 
preferable or at least more consistent with the testator's notions of 
fairness. 
§3.6. Charitable Corporation-Public Charity-Churches-Dissolu-
tion-Jurisdiction. The Supreme Judicial Court was called upon during 
the Survey year to decide whether an incorporated church functioning 
in the usual way was a "public charity." In the case of Congregational 
Church of Chicopee Falls v. Attorney General,1 a financially depressed 
church had filed a petition for voluntary dissolution in the superior 
court, citing section 11 of chapter 180 of the General Laws as authOrity 
for its petition.2 The Attorney General accepted service and assented 
to the petition and the plan for dissolution.3 Before the final judgment 
was entered on the docket, the church discovered that an interest in a 
trust had vested for its benefit two weeks prior to the final order of 
31 See note 26 supra. 
32 See Rev. Proc. 64-19, § 2.02, 1964-1 C.B. 682, which requires that the will or 
local law require either date of distribution valuation or ratable sharing. It does 
not allow the fiduciary to choose between the two. 
§3.6. 1 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2760, 381 N.E.2d 1305. 
2 Id. at 2760, 381 N.E.2d at 1306. 
3 Id. 
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dissolution.4 The court granted the church's motion for relief from 
judgment and the trustee's motion to intervene and prepared its memo-
randum of decision concerning the plan for the distribution of the trust 
fund. 5 The trustee then moved to dismiss the action for want of juris-
diction in the superior court, urging that dissolution of the church fell 
under section 11A of chapter 180, requiring that a petition be brought 
only in the Supreme Judicial Court.o The judge denied the motion and 
entered the judgment for dissolution.' The trustee appealed, and the 
Supreme Judical Court granted the joint application of the trustee and 
the Attorney General for direct appellate review.8 The trustee then 
brought as a separate action a complaint for instructions in the Supreme 
Judicial Court for Suffolk County regarding the proper disposition of 
the trust fund.!! 
Section llA applies to "[a] charitable corporation constituting a pub-
lic charity organized under the provisions of general or special law" 10 
and constitutes, by its terms, the "sole method" for the voluntary dis-
solution 11 of a public charity. Its mechanism is a petition to the Su-
preme Judicial Court requesting the Court to authorize the administra-
tion of its funds for such "similar public charitable purposes" as the 
Court may determine.12 Section 11, on the other hand, proVides the 
procedure for voluntary dissolution of charitable corporations which 
do not constitute public charities and to which the doctrine of cy pres 
is inapplicable.13 Section 11 was added during the revamping of chap-
4 ld. at 2761, 381 N.E.2d at 1306. 
5 ld. 
6 ld. at 2762, 381 N .E.2d at 1306. 
7 ld. 
BId. The Attorney General, in his brief on appeal, argued that the Superior Court 
did not have jurisdiction to dissolve the church, even though he had assented to the 
petition filed in the Superior Court pursuant to G.L. c. 180, § 11. Undoubtedly he 
made the argument because his plan for distribution of the trust fund was not 
followed by the Superior Court judge. Brief of the Attorney General, S.J.C. Doc. 
No. SJC-1313, 2-4. 
9 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2765, 381 N.E.2d at 1306. 
10 G.L. c. 180, § llA. G.L. c. 180 applies, under § 1, to "all corporations when-
ever established" and "corporation" is defined in c. 180, § 2, as a "domestic corpo-
ration (i) heretofore established by either general or special law .... " 
11 G.L. c. 180, § lIB, provides for the involuntary dissolution of a corporation 
constituting a public charity. 
12 G.L. c. 180, § lIA. The statutory scheme set forth in § § lIA and lIB of c. 
lBO is a specific application of the general common law doctrine of cy pres. In 
the Matter of Troy, 364 Mass. 15,57,306 N.E.2d 203, '1f27 (1973). 
13 G.L. c. lBO, § 11. There are many types of charitable corporations which are 
not considered public charities. See, e.g., In the Matter of Troy, 364 Mass. 15, 306 
N.E.2d 203 (1973) (social club); Assessors of Boston v. Boston Pilots' Relief 
Society, 311 Mass. 232, 40 N.E.2d 889 (1942) (relief society); Moran v. Plymouth 
Rubber Co. Mut. Benefit Ass'n, 307 Mass. 444, 30 N.E.2d 238 (1940) (mutual 
benefit association). 
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ter 180 in 1971 14 and requires that a petition be filed either in the Su-
preme Judicial Court or in the superior court.15 
The Court admitted that on a "superficial view" an incorporated church 
was a "charitable corporation" and a "public charity." 16 Since, how-
ever, there were no relevant statutory definitions of the terms, further 
analysis was required,17 It noted that the church had always operated 
as a church,18 that the church was incorporated under the General Laws 
(chapter 67) as a religiOUS corporation, and that chapter 67 makes no 
provisions for dissolution of religious corporations.19 The Court also 
noted that the enumeration of "civic, education, charitable, benevolent 
or religious" as the purposes for which a chapter 180 corporation might 
be formed did not mean a "religious" corporation was, for these pur-
poses, in a category separate from that of a "charitable" corporation.20 
Finally, the Court rejected the contention that, because a church bene-
fited only a limited number of beneficiaries, it was not a public charity.21 
Early cases in the commonwealth had held that a church was not a 
public charity.22 This view was based in part upon the proprietary 
nature of the membership.23 There has even been some discussion of 
14 Acts of 1971, c. 819. 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2763 n.3, 381 N.E.2d at 1307 
n.3. See PEAIRS, 13 MASSACHUSETTS PRACTICE, BUSINESS CORPORATIONS § 165 
(1971 with 1979 pocket part). 
15 G.L. c. 213, § lA, provides that the Superior Court shall have original juris-
diction concurrently with the Supreme Judicial Court "[u]nless otherwise specifically 
provided." The special grant to the Supreme Judicial Court in § llA of c. 180 
of jurisdiction over dissolution of public charities falls within this phrase. 
16 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2763, 381 N.E.2d at 1307. 
17 Id. No definition of "public charity" appears in G.L. c. 12, §§ 8E and F, 
which requires registration and annual reports of all public charities with the De-
partment of the Attorney General or in c. 180, §§ 1 and 2, which defines the scope 
of c. 180. 
18 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2763 nA, 381 N.E.2d at 1307 nA. A determination of 
whether a charitable corporation is a "public charity" may be made by a con-
sideration of the language in its charter or articles of organization, the constitution 
and by-laws, the declared purposes, and the actual work performed. See Carroll v. 
Commissioner of Corps. & Tax'n, 343 Mass. 409, 410, 179 N.E.2d 260, 261 (1961). 
The actual activities of the charitable corporation are of the utmost importance. In 
the Matter of Troy, 364 Mass. 15,58,306 N.E.2d 203, 227-28 (1973). 
19 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2764, 381 N.E.2d at 1307. In fact, c. 67, § 51, pro-
vides that religiOUS corporations incorporated under c. 67 shall perform the "same 
duties and with the same legal effect" as in the case of corporations organized under 
c. 180, lending support to the view that dissolution of a c. 67 religious society is 
possible only under c. 180. 
20 Id. See In the Matter of Troy, 364 Mass. 15, 57-58, 306 N.B.2d 203, ·227-28 
(1973). 
21 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2764-65, 381 N.E.2d at 1307. 
22 See, e.g., Attorney General v. Federal St. Meeting House, 69 Mass. (3 Gray) 
1 (1854). 
23 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2764 n.5, 381 N.E.2d at 1308 n.5. 
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whether a non-Christian church is a charity.24 There is now overwhelm-
ing authority, however, for the proposition that a church is a charity.25 
On a practical level, Congregational Church of Chicopee Fal~ now 
makes it clear that a church is a public charity. Such a holding goes 
beyond the issue in this case and likely applies for all technical statu-
tory purposes, including, presumably, registration and filing requirements 
applicable to public charities.26 
§3.7. Guardianships-Probate Court-Source and Scope of Powers. 
The Appeals Court in Guardianship of Bassett 1 took a substantial step 
in defining the source and scope of the probate court's authority 2 to 
create and structure guardianships of mentally retarded persons. By 
the combined use of the probate court's specific statutory powers and 
general equity powers over guardianship matters, it is now clear that 
the probate court can tailor a guardianship to meet the particular needs 
of a mentally retarded ward and can do so in a single proceeding. 
Bassett is also important because it is the first reported decision in which 
the guardian of a person is a corporate fiduciary acting through a com-
mittee.3 
In Bassett, a petition was duly brought for the appointment of a 
guardian of the person and property of Lawrence Allen Bassett, a 
moderately retardedperson.4 After the hearing, the probate court found 
Bassett competent to handle "some but not all of his personal and finan-
cial affairs," found that failure to act would create an unreasonable risk 
to Bassett,5 and appointed as guardian the Belchertown State School 
Friends Association, Inc.6 The guardian intended to handle matters 
24 See Glaser v. Congregation Kehillath Israel, 263 Mass. 435, 437, 161 N.E. 619, 
620 (1928). RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 371d (1959); 4 SCOTT, TRUSTS 
§ 371 (3d ed. 1967). 
25 See, e.g., Chase v. Dickey, 212 Mass. 555, 99 N.E. 410 (1912). But see RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 371£ (1959). 
26 G.L. c. 12, §§ 8E and 8F. 
§3.7. 1 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 186, 385 N.E.2d 1024. 
2 The Supreme Judicial Court during the Survey year also interpreted the pro-
bate court's equity powers in Feinberg v. Diamant, 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1321, 389 
N.E.2d 998. It held that a divorced parent can be compelled, under the probate 
court's general equity powers as to guardianship matters, to contribute to the 
support of an adult incapacitated child. For a discussion of Feinberg, see §5.6 infra. 
3 1978 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 190, 385 N.E.2d at 1027. 
4 Id. at 186, 385 N.E.2d at 1026. 
5 Id. at 191, 385 N.E.2d at 1028. The court again avoided the issue of the 
.burden of proof necessary to sustain the appointment of a guardian. See Doe v. 
Doe, 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 343, 385 N.E.2d 995, discussed § 8 infra; Fazio v. Fazio, 
1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1539, 378 N.E.2d 951. 
6 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 191, 385 N.E.2d at 1028. The corporation 
is nonprofit and sought to support the rights of mentally retarded persons and to 
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pertaining to the ward's person through a committee of three.7 The 
probate court judge ordered that a "guardianship plan" be filed with 
the court outlining the ward's circumstances and a specific plan of ac-
tion for his development.!l The court entered a judgment formalizing 
its orders, but, troubled by the scope of its authority, it reported ques-
tions of law to the Appeals Court.° These questions involved both the 
court's authority to appoint a guardian for a mentally retarded person 
to handle some but not all of his affairs and to appoint a corporate 
guardian acting through a committee.10 The court also sought direction 
concerning the correct procedures for doing either.H 
The Appeals Court analyzed the general powers of the probate court 
over guardianship matters in chapter 201.12 Section 6A of the chapter 
grants broad powers to the guardian and authorizes him to utilize what-
ever support services the guardian deems to be in the best interests of 
the mentally retarded ward.13 The court viewed section 6A as giving the 
probate court "what it needs to serve the problems of retarded persons 
as completely as possible." 14 No "great strain" 15 was placed on sec-
tion 6A by interpreting it to permit appointment of guardians for men-
tally retarded persons who lack decision-making capability as to some 
but not all of their personal affairs. There was some further support 
for the view that section 6A encompasses "limited" guardianships. Re-
tarded persons like Bassett who possess limited decision-making powers 
would not be able to obtain court assistance if section 6A were applied 
give them assistance. C.L. c. 201, § 6A, allows the appointment of a "nonprofit 
corporation organized under the laws of the commonwealth whose corporate charter 
authorizes the corporation to act as guardian of a mentally retarded person." 
7 Id. at 190, 385 N.E.2d at 1027. The proposal submitted to the probate court 
named three persons to serve on the Committee and stipulated that one of the three 
would be available at all times to assist the ward. Id. 
sId. at 191, 385 N.E.2d at 1028. The guardianship plan was to include, among 
other things, a statement of the particular needs, disabilities, and development 
potential of the ward and a program of specific action to assure the protection of 
the ward's health, welfare, and property by securing for the ward all necessary and 
desirable social, rehabilitation, and other services. Id. 
9 Id. 
10Id. 
11 Id. at 196, 385 N.E.2d at 1030. 
12 Id. at 198, 385 N.E.2d at 1028-29. The general statutory grant of equity 
jurisdiction over guardianship matters is found in C.L. c. 215, § 3. It should be 
noted, however, that powers over guardianship matters are limited to only those 
that are granted by statute. C. NEWHALL, SETTLEMENT OF ESTATES AND FIDUCIARY 
LAW IN MASSACHUSETTS § 370.1 (4th ed. 1958). 
13 The court noted that the Legislature in 1974 had supplemented the probate 
court's jurisdiction with respect to persons with social disabilities by adding a new 
§ 6A dealing with mentally retarded persons. Acts of 1974, c. 845, § 4. 1979 
Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 193-94, 385 N.E.2d at 1028-29. 
14 Id. at 194, 385 N.E.2d at 1029. 
15 Id. 
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only to those retarded persons who lacked total decision-making ca-
pacities.16 The court noted, for instance, that in Lane v. Candura 17 
it had contemplated situations in which a patient who was competent 
in other respects might need a guardian because of incompetency to 
make a specific medical decision.18 
The Appeals Court held that once the probate court determines the 
propriety of appointing a guardian pursuant to chapter 201, it also has 
the power under its general equity jurisdiction 19 to define how much 
authority is to be vested in the guardian. The court found that the 
grant of the probate court's equity powers is "plenary and complements, 
on matters of guardianship, the powers conferred in C.L. c. 201, §6A." 20 
Once the protective jurisdiction of the probate court attaches to a person 
properly before it, the court's powers must be broad and flexible enough 
to structure the necessary relief 21 to act in the best interests of the 
ward.22 SpeCifically, the court ruled that the combination of powers 
allowed the appointment of a committee to carry out the services of the 
corporation as guardian and the requirement that the committee file and 
follow a plan for the ward's development.23 
The court then addressed the procedural concerns of the probate court, 
elevating the substance of the proceeding over the procedural tech-
nicalities arising from the traditional separation of the strictly probate 
and equity functions of the probate courtS.24 The petition for the ap-
pointment of the guardian had been brought under section 6A of chap-
16 ld. at 195, 385 N.E.2d at 1029. 
17 1978 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 588, 376 N.E.2d 1232. 
18 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 195 n.9, 385 N.E.2d at 1029 n.9. The court 
also found support for such authority in C.L. c. 201, § 45, dealing with approval 
of certain waiver and election decisions a ward is allegedly incompetent to make. 
Further support may be found in section 16B of chapter 201 governing appoint-
ments of conservators of mentally retarded persons. This section recognizes that a 
retarded person might have the ability to handle some of his finances. 
19 C.L. c. 215, § 6. 
20 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 194, 385 N.E.2d at 1029. 
21 ld. at 195-96, 385 N.E.2d at 1029-30. See Feinberg v. Diamant, 1979 Mass. 
Adv. Sh. 1321, 389 N.E.2d 998; Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. 
Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 755-56, 370 N.E.2d 417, 433 (1977). See also LOMBARD, 
PROBATE LAw AND PRACTICE § 902 (1980 supp.). 
22 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 194, 385 N.E.2d at 1029. The "polestar" of 
any guardianship is the "best interests" of the ward. ld. For an interpretation of a 
ward's "best interests" in the context of a commitment to a mental health facility, 
see discussion of Doe v. Doe, 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 343, 385 N.E.2d 995, § 8 infra, 
and in the context of adoption proceedings see Petition of New England Home for 
Little Wanderers, 367 Mass. 631, 328 N.E.2d 854 (1975). 
23 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 196, 385 N.E.2d at 1028. 
24 The Department of Public Welfare in its brief noted that the administrative 
concerns of the probate court register in dealing with two separate dockets for one 
proceeding may indeed have precipitated the case being reported. Brief of the 
Petitioner-Appellant 13 n.4. 
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ter 201, a citation had issued, and notice had been given pursuant to 
section 7 of that chapter.25 The probate court judge had been un-
certain whether it was necessary also to bring an equity ceomplaint under 
section 6 of chapter 215 in order to invoke the equity powers of the 
court over guardianship matters.26 Since equitable proceedings in the 
probate courts are now governed by the Rules of Civil Procedure,27 a 
chapter 215, section 6, complaint would, on the face of the statute, have 
to be filed and a summons issued and served.28 The court stated that 
the Rules are to be interpreted to facilitate the administration of justice 
and that a dual proceeding "might cause some injustice" by way of delay 
to an individual,29 The "clear and obvious way" to commence a proceed-
ing was under sections 6A and 7 of chapter 201, the court ruled, and 
the petition and notice were to be treated for purposes of invoking 
equity powers as functional equivalents of a complaint and summons 
under section 6 of chapter 215.30 A second proceeding was therefore 
wmecessary.31 
In addition to these specific and novel holdings, the court once again 
indicated the need for close scrutiny by the probate court of guardian-
ship matters.32 It in effect interpreted the probate court's powers as 
giving it a wide range of tools to carry out its responsibilities over 
guardianships. While it would be unfortunate if Bassett were read as 
requiring the preparation of formal "guardianship plans" in every case, 
probate courts plainly should feel pressure now to review fully each 
ward's particular circumstances and to structure guardianships to meet 
the ward's "best interests," at least with regard to a mentally retarded 
ward.83 At a minimum, Bassett presents another alternative to a guar-
dianship in a traditional form. 34 It remains to be seen whether that 
25 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 197-98, 385 N.E.2d at 1028. 
26 ld. at 197, 385 N.E.2d at 1025. 
27 Mass. R. Civ. P., 1. 
28 Mass. R. Civ. P., 3 and 4. 
29 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 198-99, 385 N.E.2d at 1031. 
30 ld. at 198, 385 N.E.2d at 1030. 
31 ld. at 199, 385 N.E.2d at 1031. 
32 See, e.g., Doe v. Doe, 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 343, 385 N.E.2d 995, discussed § 8 
infra; Lane v. Candura, 1978 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 588, 376 N.E.2d 1232; Fazio 
v. Fazio, 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1539, 378 N.E.2d 951; Superintendent of Belchertown 
State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977). 
33 Bassett's rule as to limited guardianship probably is not applicable to guardian-
ship of mentally ill wards. C.L. c. 201, § 6. It appears to be a con~radiction in terms 
to allow a guardian for some but not all purposes in a case where the statutory 
standard for guardianship requires that the ward be "incapable of taking care of 
himself by reason of mental illness." C.L. c. 201, § 6. See Fazio v. Fazio, 1978 
Mass. Adv. Sh. 1539, 378 N.E.2d 951. 
34 Some suggested alternatives included trusts, representative payees under the 
Social Security and Veterans' Administrations, jOint bank accounts, bank accounts 
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portion of Bassett dealing with invoking equity powers through probate 
rather than equity procedures becomes a more general view. 
§3.8. Guardianship-Appointment of Guardian-Commitment of 
Mentally Ill. Continuing concern over procedural l and substantive 
safeguards in commitment proceedings in guardianships was evidenced 
during the Survey year. In a likely precedential decision, Doe v. Doe,2 
the Supreme Judicial Court set forth the standard and burden of proof 
necessary to authorize a guardian 3 to cause to "admit or commit"4 a 
ward to a mental health or retardation facility pursuant to section 6 of 
chapter 201 of the General Laws. 
In Doe, the probate court had found the ward mentally ill and in-
capable of taking care of himself and had appointed an "emergency 
temporary guardian" 5 with authOrity to authorize treatment 6 and to 
commit him to a mental health facility. Counsel was later appointed 
with permanent withdrawal orders and direct deposit of assistance checks, powers of 
attorney, guardianships of the person only, and conservatorships. See MASS. ASS'N 
FOR RETARDED CITIZENS AND MENTAL HEALTH LEGAL ADVISORS COMMITI'EE, A 
HANDBOOK ON GUARDIANSHIP, CONSERVATIONSHIP AND OTHER OPTIONS: (February, 
1978). 
3.8. 1 In a rescript decision, Laurenza v. Laurenza, 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. 
Sh. 753, 388 N.E.2d 704, the Appeals COUlt summarily vacated orders empowering 
a guardian to authorize commitment of a minor ward to a mental health or retarda-
tion facility on the grounds that the guardian was invalidly appointed because no 
notice had been given to the ward. The Appeals Court could not determine from 
the papers before it under which section of chapter 201 the guardianship was sought. 
In any of the statutory provisions governing petitions for the appointment of a 
guardian for a minor 14 years of age or older or a mentally ill or mentally retarded 
person, G.L. c. 201, §§ 2, 6, 6A, and 7, seven days prior notice must be given to 
the ward. Although notice may be dispensed with in a temporary guardianship 
proceeding, the proceeding had not been for the appointment of a temporary guardian. 
ld. G.L. c. 201, § 14. 
2 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 343, 385 N.E.2d 995. 
3 Court initiated commitments have already been held to require similar stan-
dards. See text at note 16 infra. 
4 Both Laurenza and Doe use the word "commit" interchangeably with the word 
"admit". See, e.g., 1979 i\lass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 753, 388 N.E.2d at 704; 1979 
Mass. Adv. Sh. at 348, 352,354, 385 N.E. at 1001. G.L. c. 201 also uses both terms 
interchangeably. See G.L. c. 201, §§ 6, 6A, and 14. Entering into mental health 
and retardation facilities under the authority of a guardian, however, is deemed to 
be a "voluntary admission" under c. 123, § 10. "Commitment" is made pursuant 
to the order of a physician, police, or the court. See G.L. c. 123, §§ 7, 8, and 12. 
5 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 344, 385 N.E.2d at 997. Although c. 201 makes no 
provision for an "emergency temporary guardian," presumably the probate court 
judge intended to appoint a "temporary guardian" pursuant to the emergency 
provisions of § 14 of c. 201. 
6 Only when there is an emergency situation requiring the appointment of a 
temporary guardian is there any provision for the "treatment" of a ward. Cf. G.L. 
c. 201, § 14, with c. 201, §§ 6 and 6A. The courts nevertheless apparently grant 
authority to "treat" under the provisions for permanent guardians of mentally ill, 
mentally retarded persons, and temporary guardians in non-emergency situations. 
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for the ward.; Although the ward had stated that he did not want 
to stay in the hospital,S the judge found "by a preponderance of the 
evidence" that it was in the ward's "best interests" to remain in the 
hospital.9 The ward's father was appointed guardian with authority 
to authorize treatment and to admit the ward to a mental health hos-
pital.10 The judge reported questions of law to the Appeals Court and 
the Supreme Judicial Court granted the ward's application for direct 
appellate reviewP 
The Supreme Judicial Court held that section 6 requires a finding, 
beyond a reasonable doubt,12 that failure to commit would create a 
"likelihood of serious harm" as defined in section 1 of chapter 123, which 
governs involuntary civil commitments.13 By construing the statute in 
that fashion, the Court found that it was not unconstitutional. 14 The 
Court expressly recognized that a commitment of an incompetent per-
; 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 344, 385 N.E.2d at 997. 
8 ld. at 346, 385 N.E.2d at 997. 
!lId. 
10 ld. at 344, 385 N.E.2d at 997. 
11 ld. 
12 Two months after Doe was decided, the United States Supreme Court held, in 
Addington v. Texas, 99 S. Ct. 1804 (1979), that a reasonable doubt standard was 
not required under the United States Constitution in civil commitment proceedings. 
The Court held that due process demands recluired that the burden be "equal to or 
greater than" a "clear and convincing" evidence standard. It reasoned that the 
reasonable doubt standard was inappropriate because, given the uncertainties of 
psychiatric diagnosis, the standard might impose a burden a state could not meet 
and thereby erect an "unreasonable barrier" to needed medical treatment. ld. at 
1812-13. The Supreme Judicial Court has historically viewed United States Con-
stitutional precedents as requiring a reasonable doubt standard. See Superintendent 
of Worcester State Hosp. v. Hagberg, 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 187, 372 N.E.2d 242 
(civil commitment); Andrews, petitioner, 368 Mass. 468, 334 N.E.2d 15 (1975) 
(commitment of sexually dangerous persons). It has not specifically used the Massa-
chusetts Constitution as its basis. Absent a holding that the Massachusetts Constitu-
tion is to be read to require a stricter standard than the United States Constitution, 
it cannot be said with any certainty that, after Addington, the Supreme Judicial Court 
will still require the reasonable doubt standard. Given the Supreme Judicial Court's 
consistent requirement of a reasonable doubt standard in related areas, however, 
and that its analysis in Doe purports to be a statutory analysis, it is more likely than 
not that the Court will continue to require a stricter standard, notwithstanding 
Addington. 
13 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 354, 385 N.E.2d at 1001. G.L. c. 123, § 1, sets forth 
three categories for the likelihood of serious harm: 
"Likelihood of serious harm", (1) a substantial risk of physical harm to the 
person himself as manifested by evidence of threats of, or attempts at, suicide 
or serious bodily harm; (2) a substantial risk of physical harm to other persons 
as manifested bv evidence of homicidal or other violent behavior or evidence 
that others are placed in reasonable fear of violent behavior and serious physical 
harm to them; or (3) a very substantial risk of physical impairment or injury 
to the person himself as manifested by evidence that such person's judgment is 
so affected that he is unable to protect himself in the community and that 
reasonable provision for his protection is not available in the community. 
14 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 344, 385 N.E.2d at 997. 
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son by a guardian pursuant to chapter 201 produced the "same loss of 
freedom and the same label of mental illness" as commitment of a 
competent person by court order under chapter 123 of the General 
Laws.15 Involuntary civil commitments have previously required proof 
regarding a reasonable doubt of the likelihood of serious harm.16 The 
aim of the Court's ruling was to give an incompetent person under 
guardianship the same rights and choices as those available to a com-
petent person in involuntary civil commitment proceedings.Ii 
The Court reviewed the statutory and judicial history of both kinds 
of commitment proceedings.1s The review demonstrated that the devel-
opment of stringent standards for involuntary civil commitment of com-
petent persons pursuant to chapter 123 has progressed at a faster pace 
than those in guardian commitments under section 201, presumably 
because of the traditional assumption that a guardian has his ward's 
best interests at heart and possibly also because the incompetent ward 
is unable to speak for himself. Since 1970 an involuntary civil com-
mitment pursuant to chapter 123 could be made only on a finding that 
a failure to commit would create a "likelihood of serious harm." 19 The 
finding must now be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.20 Prior to 
1970 a finding was required merely that the ward was mentally ill and 
a "proper subject for treatment in a hospital." 21 It was not until 1977, 
however, that chapter 201 was amended to require that a commitment or 
admission by a guardian be made only if it is in the "best interests" of a 
ward. The amendment, however, enumerates no factors constituting 
"best interests" and no standards for making this determination.22 Prior 
to 1977, the guardian appeared to have absolute discretion, without even 
a court hearing.23 
The Court in Doe interpreted the "best interests" finding as an addi-
tional requirement over and above the standards of mental illness re-
quired for a guardianship.24 This requirement suggested a legislative 
15 ld. at 354, 385 N.E.2d at 1001. 
16 Superintendent of Worcester State Hosp. v. Hagberg, 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 187, 
372 N .E.2d 242. 
17 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 354, 385 N.E.2d at 1001. 
18 ld. at 346-50, 385 N.E.2d at 998-99. 
19 C.L. c. 123, §§ 7, 8(a), and 12. 
:w Superintendent of Worcester State Hosp. v. Hagberg, 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 
187,372 N.E.2d 242. 
21 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 348, 385 N.E.2d at 998. 
22 ld. at 350, 385 N.E.2d at 998, 999. 
23 ld. at 347-48, 385 N.E.2d at 998. 
24 ld. at 350-51, 385 N.E.2d at 999. The Court has not yet addressed the issue 
of what standard of proof is necessary in guardianship proceedings which do not 
necessarily or directly involve or result in commitment. ld. at 354, 385 N.E.2d at 
1001. See Fazio v. Fazio, 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1539, 1548, 378 N.E.2d 951, 955. 
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judgment that a commitment may not be appropriate even though the 
ward is mentally ill and unable to care for himself.25 In addition to 
taking into account the ward's stated preference as a "critical factor" in 
the determination of a ward's "best interests," 26 the Court read into 
the "best interests" requirement of chapter 201 the necessity of a finding 
of a "likelihood of serious harm" 27 by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.2R 
In the instant case the ward had expressed a "comprehensible opinion 
and strong feeling" that he should not be committed.2n Furthermore, 
since the ward was neither suicidal nor homicidal at the time of the 
probate court hearing, the Court stated that the ward would have to 
be found to be facing "a very substantial risk of physical impairment 
or injury." 30 The Court ruled that this "best interests" standard, as 
interpreted, met constitutional requirements.3 ! 
The decision leaves several questions unanswered. Although the 
Court found that commitment pursuant to chapter 201 produces the 
same loss of freedom and same label of mental illness as commitment 
under chapter 123, the Court limited its holding to section 6 guardian-
ships of mentally ill persons. While a similar finding should be appro-
priate under section 6A guardianships of mentally retarded persons, it 
may be that the conditions requiring the appointment of a temporary 
guardian in order to commit a ward permit a lesser burden of proof 
because of the existence of an emergency situation. 32 It may well be 
that the nature of the confinement should have a bearing on the stan-
dard and burden of proof needed for an admission.33 The Court in-
25 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 351, 385 N.E.2d at 999. 
26 ld. at 352, 385 N.E.2d at 1000. 
27 ld. As that term is defined in C.L. c. 123, § 1, governing court ordered com-
mitments. C.L. c. 123, § 1, requires a showing of suicidal or homicidal tendencies 
or "a very substantial risk of physical impairment or injury." 
28 ld. at 354, 385 N.E.2d at 1001. 
29 ld. at 353, 385 N.E.2d at 1000. 
30 ld. at 352, 385 N.E.2d at 1000. 
3! ld. at 355, 385 N.E.2d at 1001. See text at note 22 supra. The imposition of 
the reasonable doubt standard apparently could have been supported by either a due 
process analYSis or by an equal protection analysis. See Comment, 13 SUFFOLK U.L. 
REv. 191, 193 (1979). 
32 It should be noted that an emergency commitment pursuant to § 12 of c. 123 
may last only ten days. It might be possible to allow the appointment of a tempo-
rary guardian with authority to admit a ward in an emergency situation pursuant 
to § 14 of c. 201. Since, however, admission by a guardian is considered "voluntary" 
under § 10 of c. 123, there is no automatic mechanism for a review of the ward's 
admission. 
33 The United States Supreme Court in holding that a standard lesser than a 
reasonable doubt was required in Addington v. Texas, 435 U.S. 967 (1979), noted 
that the Texas statute on civil commitment entitled the patient to treatment, to 
periodic and recurrent review of his mental condition and to release at such time 
that the patient was no longer a danger to himself and to others. 
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dicated that it may employ the doctrine of "substituted judgment," that 
is, judgment of tbe guardian, in order to determine the ward's desires.34 
Finally, it is not clear what kind of evidence is necessary to establish 
a likelihood of serious harm for a ward who falls into Doe's category. 
The Court had referred to the categories of "serious harm" as set forth 
in section 1 of chapter 123 and had placed Doe into the category of 
"a very substantial risk of physical impairment or injury." The Court 
suggests that there might be evidence on the issue that the ward's 
"judgment is so affected that he is unable to protect himself in the com-
munity" and that "reasonable provision for his protection is not available 
in the community." 35 This suggestion is merely a restatement of the 
legal requirements set forth in that particular category. It has been 
suggested that the kinds of physical injury or impairment contemplated 
may be starvation or "overexposure to the elements." It may well be 
that because the harm contemplated in the third category is likely to 
occur more gradually than the harm from the first two categories of 
suicide and homicide, the likelihood of its occurrence is required to 
be greater.36 
§3.9. Legislation-Self-Proving Affidavits-Temporary Executor-
Temporary Administrator with the Will Annexed-Creditor's Claims. 
Chapter 546 of the Acts of 1979 made several changes to statutory sec-
tions enacted by the so-called "Omnibus Probate Act" of 1976.1 Sec-
tion 2 of chapter 192 of the General Laws was amended to permit a 
will to be allowed without testimony if it is self-proved by affidavit of 
the testator and the witnesses.2 The affidavit may now be made before 
an officer authorized to administer oaths under the laws of the state 
where executed.3 Prior to the amendment, the affidavit stated that it 
could only be made in Massachusetts.4 The amendment conforms to 
the provisions of the Uniform Probate Code.5 Section 1 of chapter 192 
34 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 351-52, 385 N.E.2d at 1000. See Superintendent of 
Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977). 
35 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 352, 385 N.E.2d at 1000. 
36 Walker, Mental Health Law Reform in Massachusetts, 53 B.U. L. REv. 986, 
994 (1973). 
§3.9. 1 Acts of 1976, c. 515. For an analysis of its provisions, see DeGiacomo 
and Wyman, Trusts & Estates, 1977 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW § 3.12 at 53-61; Young, 
Probate Change, 20 Boston Bar J. 6 (December 1976). 
2 Acts of 1979, c. 546, § 1, amending § 2 of c. 192, as amended by Acts of 
1976, c. 515, § 9, and was effective 90 days after its approval on August 20, 1979. 
3 Acts of 1979, c. 546, § 1. 
4 See former c. 192 § 2 (Acts of 1976, c. 515, § 9). 
5 UNIFORM PROBATE CODE, as amended by the 1975 Amendments, § 2-504. The 
Uniform Code with official comments was promulgated in August 1969, approved 
by the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association, and was adopted by the 
National Conference of Commissions on Uniform State Laws. There are now 14 
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also eliminates the requirement of filling in the testator's and witnesses' 
names in the affidavit,6 thereby reducing the possibility of oversight and 
error. 
Section 13 of chapter 192 was amended 7 to clarify the notice provi-
sions for the appointment of a temporary executor, because it had been 
unclear whether notice could be dispensed with if there were minors 
or incompetent heirs or next of kin. When a testator has requested a 
temporary executor in his will, the probate court may appoint as such 
the named executor or executors without notice if the surviving spouse 
and all heirs at law and next of kin of full age and competence assent 
to the petition.s If the assents are not obtained, the court may appoint 
the named executor upon seven days' written notice of intent to seek 
the appointment to all heirs at law and next of kin of the decedent.9 
Where a testator has not requested a temporary executor in his will, 
however, the court may nevertheless appoint a temporary executor if 
the surviving spouse and all heirs at law and next of kin of full age and 
competence assent to the petition.1O 
Similar amendments were made to section 7 A of chapter 193 of the 
General Laws with respect to notice requirements for the appointment 
of a temporary administrator with the will annexed.H Although a com-
mentator has stated that the amendments merely "clarify the language 
which was ambiguous," 12 it is suggested that the amendments do make 
a substantive change to these notice provisions. Prior to the amend-
ment, the probate court could appoint a temporary administrator with 
the will annexed without notice if the testator had requested the ap-
pointment, whether or not surviving spouse and all heirs at law and 
next of kin of full age and competence had assented.13 The amended 
states which have adopted all of the Uniform Probate Code and 3 states which have 
adopted portions of it. 
() The Uniform Probate Code provides for the filling in of the testator's and 
witnesses' names. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE, § 2-504, as amended by the 1975 
amendments. 
7 Acts of 1979, c. 546, § 2, amending § 13 of c. 192, added by Acts of 1976, 
c. 515, § 10, and was effective 90 days after its approval on August 20, 1979. 
S Acts of 1979, c. 546, § 2. 
9 ld. Although the statute calls for the assent of the surviving spouse, heirs at 
law, and next of kin, it requires notice only to the heirs at law and next of kin. 
The reason for specifically including the surviving spouse in the first instance and 
not in the second is unclear, since the surviving spouse is an heir at law and entitled 
to notice in either instance. See Sweeney v. Kennard, 331 Mass. 542, 120 N.E.2d 
910 (1954). 
10 Acts of 1979, c. 546, § 2. 
11 Acts of 1979, c. 546, § 3, amending § 7 A of c. 193, added by Acts of 1976, c. 
515, § 11. It became effective 90 days after its approval on August 20, 1979. 
12 G. NEWHALL, SETTLEMENT OF ESTATES AND FIDUCIARY LAW IN MASSACHUSETTS 
§ 61.1 n.2 (4th ed. 1958 with 1980 cum. supp.). 
13 See former c. 193, § 7 A (Acts of 1976, c. 515, § 11). 
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statute now requires that, unless those parties assent, seven days' written 
notice of the intent to seek such an appointment must be given to all 
heirs at law and next of kin.H It is still possible, as with the appointment 
of a temporary executor, to secure the appointment of a temporary ad-
ministrator, even if the testator does not request it in his will, without 
notice, so long as the surviving spouse and all heirs at law and next of 
kin of full age and competence assent. \Vith one exception, these amend-
ments have resulted in parallel provisions for the appointment of a tem-
porary executor and a temporary administrator with the will annexed. 
Only the party named as executor in the will may be appointed temporary 
executor. It does not appear, however, that the temporary administrator 
with the will annexed must be the same party petitioning to become per-
manent administrator with the will annexed.15 
The procedure for the presentation of claims against a decedent's 
estate, section 9 of chapter 197 of the General Laws, was also amended 
during the Survey year.16 A creditor whose claim has been allowed 
pursuant to the provisions of that section 17 but who has not been paid 
may now file a complaint in the probate court and secure an order di-
recting the executor or administrator to pay the claims to the extent that 
funds are available for payment. The new section is now in conformity 
with the Uniform Probate Code.18 Although no time limit is specified 
in section 9 for filing the complaint for payment, a limit is implied at 
least by the provision that there be "funds ... available for payment." 19 
The statute also does not address what time period for payment the 
court may order.20 Of specific concern, the statute does not prohibit 
the court from directing payment prior to the expiration of the sec-
tion 9 period. The fiduciary may find himself in an awkward position 
indeed if he has been directed to pay a claim which depletes the estate's 
assets during the nine-month period, only to discover that additional 
claims are still outstanding and yet to be presented. Furthermore, there 
is no definition of what comprises "funds ... available for payment." 21 
Such a term mayor may not allow a fiduciary to retain a reserve for 
14 Acts of 1979, c. 546, § 2. 
15 Cf. C.L. c. 192, § 13, with C.L. c. 193, § 7 A. 
16 Acts of 1979, c. 546, § 5, amending § 9 of c. 197, as amended by Acts of 1976, 
c. 515, § 15. It became effective 90 days after its approval on August 20, 1979. 
17 A claim can be allowed pursuant to § 9 of c. 197 by a judgment in a pro-
ceeding in another court against the executor or administrator or by the action or 
inaction on the part of an executor or administrator in response to a claim filed 
with him or with the probate court within four months of the approval of his bond. 
C.L. c. 197, § 9. 
18 UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 3-807. 
19 Acts of 1979, c. 546, § 5. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. 
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future contingencies, including other creditors' claims and additional 
estate taxes.22 
§3.10. Legislation-Voluntary Administration-Voluntary Executor. 
Section 16 of chapter 195 of the General Laws, which deals with volun-
tary administration, was amended twice during the Survey year. The 
first amendment increased from two to three thousand dollars the maxi-
mum amount of personal property, in addition to an automobile, which 
a decedent's estate can contain and still be eligible for voluntary adminis-
tration.1 The probate estate must still consist solely of personal prop-
erty.2 The second amendment provided that the statement required 
by the probate court to be filed under oath by the putative voluntary 
administrator must now include the names and addresses known to the 
affiant of all persons who would take by intestacy. a 
A new position of voluntary executor was created by the insertion 
of section 16A in chapter 195.4 Its provisions are similar to those for 
the voluntary administrator but are designed for disposing of assets in 
accordance with a decedent's will, where the probate estate consists 
entirely of a motor vehicle and personal property not in excess of three 
thousand dollars." To become a voluntary executor, the person named 
as executor in the will must file a statement under oath containing the 
same information required in a voluntary administration and a list of 
the names and addresses known to the affiant of persons who would 
take under the will.6 Upon filing the statement and paying the filing 
fee, the person becomes voluntary executor.; After the payment of 
debts and expenses, the voluntary executor must distribute any balance 
according to the terms of the will. 8 If it is "impossible" to distribute the 
property in accordance with the will's terms, the balance is to be dis-
tributed to the surviving spouse, if any, or otherwise to those who would 
take in the case of an intestacy. 9 
22 Any fiduciary who is concerned with the possibility of an insolvent estate should 
be all the more certain to disallow any claims made during the first four months 
after his appointment which do not have priority over taxes. See C.L. c. 197, § 9. 
§3.10. 1 Acts of 1979, c. 209, amending § 16 of c. 195. It became effective 90 
days after its approval on May 22, 1979. 
2 C.L. c. 195, § 16. 
3 Acts of 1979, c. 744, § 1, amending § 16 of c. 195. It became effective 90 
days after its approval on November 14, 1979. 
4 Acts of 1979, c. 744, § 2, effective 90 days after its approval on November 14, 
1979. 
5 C.L. c. 195, § 16A. 
6 Subsection (h) of the first paragraph of § 16A of c. 195 is the only additional 
requirement made in the statement to be filed by the voluntary administrator. Gf. 
C.L. c. 195, § 16. 
7 C.L. c. 195, § 16A. 
8 ld. 
9 ld. 
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Before the enactment of the voluntary executor provision, it was not 
unoommon to file a will 10 but take out voluntary administration rather 
than have it probated. The property would pass to the surviving spouse 
even if the will provided otherwise. With the enactment of section 16A, 
it is unclear whether this option is still available. There may be situa-
tions when voluntary administration is preferable, even though a will 
exists. For example, the named executor may be a nonresident, de-
ceased, or have declined to serve. Additionally, if the residuary bene-
ficiary is not the surviving spouse, it may make sense to have the prop-
perty pass to the surviving spouse. Since property passes to the 
surviving spouse under voluntary administration, the legatee can thus 
avoid filing a disclaimer of his interest in the will, and the estate can 
save the expense and bother of probating the will and filing a waiver 
by the spouse. Given the apparent legislative intent to provide a means 
for inexpensive and efficient administration of small estates, at least 
upon good cause shown, voluntary administration should be permitted 
even if a will exists and voluntary executorship is possible. The new 
procedure should be viewed as optional, not mandatory. Newhall, ap-
parently subscribing to the option interpretation, points out that there 
is nothing in either section which appears to preclude a statement from 
one person seeking to be voluntary administrator and another seeking 
to be voluntary executor.ll 
In the new procedure, the person named in the will as executor must 
be an inhabitant of the commonwealth in order to serve as voluntary 
executor,12 and there is no provision for the proof of the will. Un-
fortunately for prospective voluntary executors, there are no standards 
for determining the "impossibility" of distribution of property in ac-
cordance with the terms of the will,l3 The effective date for the legis-
lation was February 12, 1980.14 As was the case with some prOvisions 
of the Omnibus Probate Act, it is not clear whether the statute applies 
10 C.L. c. 191, §§ 7 and 13. 
11 C. NEWHALL, SETTLEMENT OF ESTATES A:-':D FIDUCIARY LAW IN MASSACHUSETTS 
§ 6 (4th ed. 1958 with 1980 cum. supp.). 
12 C.L. c. 195, § 16A. Although a voluntary administrator must also be an in-
habitant of the commonwealth, the statute provides a list of relatives who may 
serve in that capacity. ld. C.L. c. 195, § 16. The requirement that an inhabitant 
of the commonwealth serve as voluntary executor may restrict the usefulness of the 
statute. The requirement is important, in theory, because the safeguards resulting 
from the appointment by a nonresident fiduciary of an agent in the commonwealth 
upon whom legal process may be served are not applicable to the legislative scheme 
as set forth in C.L. c. 195, §§ 16 and 16A. 
13 C.L. c. 195, § 16A. Since a voluntary executor is liable as an executor de son 
tort to persons "aggrieved by his administration" of the estate, he acts at his peril 
if he does not distribute the property in accordance with the terms of the will. 
14 Acts of 1979, c. 209, was approved on May 22, 1979, and was effective 90 days 
thereafter. 
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to decedents dying on or after February 12, 1980, wills written on or 
subsequent to that date, or voluntary executor statements filed on or sub-
sequent to that date. I5 As was the case with that Act, corrective legis-
lation is probably called for to clarify the effective date. 
§3.11. Legislation-Beneficiary Designation-Deferred Compensa-
tion-Retirement Plan. Section 68 of chapter 167 provides that a bene-
ficiary deSignation of any employee benefit plan enumerated in' that 
section is valid notwithstanding the statute of wills. 1 Section 68 was 
amended by chapter 326 of the Acts of 1979 2 to eliminate the possible 
implication that a beneficiary designation of an employee benefit plan 
not so enumerated might be interpreted to be an invalid testamentary 
disposition. 
15 See Acts of 1976, c. 515, §§ 33-35, and the corrections to effective dates by 
Acts of 1977, c. 76, § 2, approved with emergency preamble March 28, 1977. 
§3.11. 1 G.L. c. 167, § 68. 
2 Acts of 1979, c. 326, effective 90 days after its approval on June 25, 1979. 
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